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7Resources for development
By and large, Moldova’s geographic and natural endowment is not conducive to an eﬀ ortless long-
term development. Because of lacking easy access to the sea and due to its poor transport and 
customs infrastructure, Moldova has not been able so far to get any close to its much nurtured 
dream of becoming a bridge between East and West. While some on-going technical projects are 
likely to open Moldova a bit more to the international trade and transport, the country needs 
impeccable trade and transport regulatory environment and much more infrastructure investment 
in order to not being totally overrun by its main regional competitor, Ukraine. Moldova has got 
a good endowment of only agricultural resources, including fertile land and relatively propitious 
climate, but other countries in the region are equally or even better equipped with such resources. 
In order for these natural resources to serve the country’s long-term economic development, 
Moldova has to properly manage and protect its soil, adapt to the more volatile, but on average 
hotter and drier, climate likely to dominate in the not-so-distant future and make more eﬃ  cient 
use of its limited water resources. A key economic and geopolitical constraint for the country is 
lack of own energy resources on the one hand and the low level of the energy eﬃ  ciency across 
the economy and society on the other.
Human resource is the most valuable asset that the country has yet to fully make use of in order 
to set on a sustainable development path. Moldova has a two decade-long history of losing its 
high-skilled human capital and still continues losing it through migration. No doubt, unless labor 
productivity and salaries converge faster to the average level of Central Europe the migration 
will remain the most attractive career option for the most educated Moldovan youth. Poor 
and insuﬃ  cient productive capital remains the key constraint undermining labor productivity. 
Moldova needs much bigger volume of public, private and foreign investment in order to close 
its technological and productivity gap with other countries in the region and to get rid of its 
geographical curse. Another key point, discarded so far by the domestic policy practice, is that 
with insuﬃ  cient and little diversifi ed natural resources Moldova has to get highly eﬃ  cient in using 
its domestic (soils, water, some minerals) and imported (energy) resources.
Economic policy for development
The Moldovan version of the economic policy has traditionally encompassed a set of arbitrary 
and opaque administrative practices enabling the government to eﬀ ectively control the business. 
An overextended system of state control bodies, a vast and ineﬃ  cient public administration and a 
pervasive system of pecuniary payments and imposed social responsibility conspired to undermine 
the domestic private sector. What is particularly worrying is that private companies apparently 
got accustomed to this way of doing business and there were no systematic protests against it. 
After the initial macroeconomic debacle in early transition period, Moldova has achieved some 
sort of macroeconomic stabilization by 2000-2001. Achieving more of it was precluded by high 
public budgetary commitments of the Moldovan government (comparable to OECD average in 
relative terms) and lack of necessary institutional and structural measures to redress infl ationary 
pressures. Moldova has got a rather underdeveloped fi nancial system which is unable to amass 
domestic savings at reasonably low costs to transform them in long-term deposits and fi nance 
investment. Presently, the commercial banks are in rather diﬃ  cult situation (even though less 
troubled than in all other countries in the region) because of the increasing share on non-
E x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y
8performing loans concentrated in two sectors (constructions and winemaking) with potentially 
escalating risks. Moldova has also accomplished a high level of integration in the world economy 
while the geographic diversifi cation is practically similar to what gravitational trade theory 
predicts. However, because of the worsening terms of trade, poorly diversifi ed exports and 
growing needs of a growing economy, Moldova’s foreign trade has become utterly unbalanced.
Short of domestic capital and with so many innate weaknesses, it is vitally important for Moldova 
to become at least in institutional terms the most attractive eastern European country for the 
international investors. A more advanced industrial and business infrastructure is both necessary 
and possible to put in place using existing EU funding opportunities. Moldova has a long way 
to go to close its technological and productivity gap with Europe and there is no time to lose 
because Europe moves very fast. As human resource are the most valuable for the economic 
growth, Moldova has also to completely change the way its education sector “performs” in order 
to make valuable use of these resources and to produce specialists for the domestic economy 
rather than migrants ending up working on construction sites or providing low-skilled services 
in Europe and CIS. Educational institutions have to stop being self-suﬃ  cient and inward-looking, 
but rather get extroverted while developing more ties with their peers in Europe, with research 
community in Moldova and abroad and, whenever relevant, establish cooperation with both 
domestic and international companies.
Domestic politics
Moldovan society is quite diverse and heterogeneous not least because the country’s history 
has had a very tumultuous and complex evolution. This heterogeneity if not transformed into 
creative synergies ushers emergence of dividing lines which make people easy prey for political 
manipulation and populism. Now these dividing lines (ethnical, linguistic, etc.) are as vivid as ever, 
while Moldova appears to have gone the full cycle of failed attempts of “nation-building” based 
on ethnical identities often opposed to civic identities. Besides that diﬀ erent communities pulled 
in often opposing directions by strong outside geopolitical poles, which also happen to be former 
metropolis. The attractiveness of the respective poles has been “nurtured” along these years 
by successive policy failures of Moldovan political class. Continuous failure to deliver on basic 
obligations by Moldovan state as well as perpetuation of “ethnically”-colored political discourse 
will make the “nation-building” quest more and more elusive.
Furthermore, this failure coupled with detachment of political process from ordinary peoples’ 
expectations leads to public disenchantment with politics and open or hidden dissatisfaction with 
the way the country develops and way it is governed. At the same time, majority of Moldovans 
feels their opinions do not matter in the decision-making process, lacks interest in politics, doubts 
correctness of the electoral process and has no trust in political parties. In 2009 this uninspiring 
combination fl avored with such ingredients as suppression of opposition groups and media, 
aggressive electoral campaigning and manipulations, as well as economic hardship, led to the 
biggest social unrest since the late 80’s. In a sense, the April 2009 events shattered not only the 
most important governmental buildings, but also any persisting illusion with respect to the state 
of Moldovan democracy and governance. The repeated elections that led to the emergence of 
coalition government oﬀ er new hope for Moldova: diﬀ erent quarters of political class as well as 
diﬀ erent social groups in Moldovan society will have to learn how to communicate to each other 
and to seek consensus on public policy matters for the sake of Moldova’s development. This 
hope should not be wasted.
Foreign policy
As any small country, Moldova is subject to infl uences of bigger geopolitical players and it is also 
a place where interests of these players meet or collide. Adding another twist to this picture is 
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EU or returning to the “Russian” world. Furthermore, Moldova’s foreign policy cannot be fully 
untied from the reality: there is a series of constraints varying from economic ties to fl uid global 
and regional geopolitical context. Moldovan diplomacy should be indeed the art of the possible. 
Indeed, Moldova is strongly connected both to the EU and Russia via trade and investment. 
Russia is the main destination for Moldovan exports on the country level, while more than half of 
all Moldovan exports goes to the European market. Most of FDI coming to Moldova comes from 
the EU, while Russia also holds important share. Furthermore, Moldova’s energy supply is highly 
dependent on Russia, while integration in the European energy architecture is the only viable 
alternative for Moldova. 
The other major connection is labor migration: Russia and the EU are main destinations for 
Moldovan labor migrants, meaning that these are places of origin of remittances that help 
keeping Moldovan economy afl oat. 
The intimate ties do not stop here, however. Both Russia and EU (increasingly) hold key for 
territorial reintegration of Moldova; as well as hold signifi cant infl uence over the minds of 
Moldovans through mass media, Church and development aid, while European integration has 
seemed to be a zeitgeist in Moldovan public discourse. No surprise, the public perception on the 
country’s present and future is quite blurred: slight majority of Moldovans see Russia as the main 
strategic partner much ahead of the EU, but roughly two-thirds of Moldovans would vote in favor 
of the accession to EU. EU-supporters should not be enchanted by this overwhelming support for 
their cause; almost 44% of Moldovans would vote re-unifi cation under auspices of a reformed and 
modernized Soviet Union. Easy to see, at least 10% of the population would vote for two (or more, 
if available) unifi cation options at a time.
Certainly, these are not the only foreign policy constraints. The international and regional 
geopolitical landscape has been increasingly fl uid of lately. Within last couple of years, the leading 
geopolitical player, the US, has become somewhat disentangled from the processes in the 
former Soviet periphery and has also tried to reset relations with Russia. Russia itself has become 
increasingly assertive abroad, while its interests towards former Soviet Union countries are also on 
the rise. At the same time EU has started implementation of the Lisbon Treaty which requires more 
concentration on internal institutional issues, while its members appear sometimes divided on 
foreign policy issues. Furthermore, this year will fi nd Ukraine, an important neighbor of Moldova’s, 
in post-electoral transition towards a more Russia-friendly political regime. On the western side, 
spurred by the establishment of the much friendlier government in Chisinau and electoral victory 
of its fervently pro-Atlantist president, Romania’s role seems to be on the rise. And not to forget, 
the world is still at pains to shrug oﬀ  the repercussions of the global fi nancial meltdown and this 
fact weighs heavily on the foreign policy decisions taken by the global and regional actors. 
All this as well as heterogeneous nature of governing coalition will require a balanced and 
cautious approach both to foreign and domestic policy decisions, bearing the overarching goal of 
European integration in mind.
Global challenges
The future is inherently uncertain. The future of a small country is “uncertain+” as such countries 
often lack resources and power to infl uence and mitigate the global challenges. This report 
outlines four main global challenges for Moldova, although the list may well vary as time goes 
by. These challenges are: global economic crises, climate change, food shortages, and eventual 
global energy run-out. 
On most of accounts Moldova fi nds itself at the receiving end, nonetheless, it will have to deal 
with consequences of these challenges.
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Take fi rst the global economic crisis of 2008. Not only it represented the worst economic 
development on the global scale since the Great Depression, it also shattered the foundations 
on which was laid the global economic order as we know it. A series of open questions remain 
over the way the global economy will look like in the near future. The impact of the crisis does 
not end with the economy; it also spills over into the realm of geopolitics shedding light on some 
important shifts in the global balance of power. The scale of these risks is no doubt beyond 
Moldova’s powers; however, searching at least some adaptation solutions is a necessity. These 
solutions should not be limited to but may include: establishment of the special emergency fund 
to deal with fi rst-hand impacts of the future economic crises, putting forward new industrial 
policy and making better use of foreign aid.
Further on, climate change has already made the headlines both in Moldova and abroad. 
Make no mistake the challenge posed by climate change is daunting. Moldovan climate is 
expected to become hotter and dryer, while extreme weather events – to intensify. But again, 
mitigation solutions are to be found mostly on global level, while adaptation solutions are to be 
found mostly by domestic actors. These adaptation measures should not jeopardize or derail 
Moldova’s development plans and take into account limited resources at hand. Therefore, the 
tentative solutions should center around eﬃ  cient use of available resources and investment in 
key infrastructure able to withstand the future climate pressures and be supported by stronger 
international involvement on that matter.
Another ominous development of recent years has been price hikes for food. Indeed, in 2002-
2008 global food prices expanded almost two-fold, retreating somewhat in the aftermath of 
global fi nancial crisis of 2008. More numerous and richer population, re-direction of agricultural 
resources towards energy production, more expansive inputs, commodity market frenzy, as well 
as years of neglect in agriculture at global scale have all contributed to this state of aﬀ airs. For 
Moldova, as agricultural country, such a development is not necessarily a bad thing. However, in 
order to benefi t from this development and oﬀ set the adverse impact of such developments as 
more expensive fertilizers, soil degradation, convoluted market structure and others, Moldova 
needs to improve on two accounts: production and market access. New land use practices should 
be employed, agricultural inputs from new crop varieties to disease-resistant livestock should be 
enhanced, and market structure should be reassessed and streamlined. 
The oil run-out and sprawling energy prices is yet another fear haunting the world. The robust 
growth of world economy led to growing demand for black oil, leading to much higher prices for 
oil and energy resources in general. Nonetheless, not only rocketing demand is to blame. Lower 
investment in oil industry and lower output are also at play, while commodity market exuberance 
and politicization of the energy issue poured more oil to the fi re. Thus, the expensive energy seems 
to be a long-standing reality. At the same time, Moldova is poor in energy resources importing 
over 90% to satisfy its needs, while the supply of energy is not diversifi ed. In order to come on 
terms with this situation, Moldova’s approach should be two-fold: limiting external vulnerabilities 
by increasing local production and changing the mix of energy used and diversifying supply. 
Smaller components might include small-scale hydro-power generation and renewable energy 
development, energy eﬃ  ciency and conservation (both equipments and buildings), shifts in tariﬀ  
policy and switch to more use of power instead of natural gas. Integration with the European 
energy networks (both power and gas) should also be vigorously pursued.
This report shows that Moldova faces daunting tasks of alleviating the plethora of its innate 
weaknesses. As hard as they may seem, fi nding some solutions to these, at least for the time 
being, should not be seen as a “mission impossible”. This report attempts to chart the sea that 
Moldova goes, to map out the areas where underwater stones may lie and to help it navigate 
the turbulent waters. In any case, we wanted to provide a palpable contribution to the general 
discussion on Moldova’s present and future and hope this contribution may serve as a platform 
for further and broader debate. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
The “Moldova 2009: State of the Country Report” is the second state of the country report 
published by the Expert-Grup think-tank. It was developed and prepared as part of the project 
“Moldova 2009: State of the Country Report – How to Continue Developing in a Turbulent Global 
and Domestic Environment?”. The project benefi ted of the fi nancial support of the Black Sea 
Trust (Bucharest, Romania) and the Balkan Trust for Democracy (Belgrade, Serbia). 
Current political and economic situation in Moldova is of a critical nature and setting perspectives 
for long-term development trends in the society. The process of strengthening civil society 
involvement in policies development reached a decent level of maturity, with a strong potential 
to produce a number of adequate analyses and diagnoses of various processes in the country. 
Despite the need to further improve the quality of the contribution provided by NGOs, and to 
make their inputs more consistent and recommendations more realistic there are already plenty 
of examples of civil society participation in public life including changes in major problematic 
areas in the society. These concerns fi rst of all are the areas of human rights, justice and economic 
development as well as corruption, and freedom of media. In 2009 many civil society organizations 
have been very active and often pro-active in all these spheres. In early 2010 a National Participation 
Council composed of 30 national NGOs was set up with the purpose to facilitate government’s 
dialogue with civil society on various policy issues. However, as civil society organizations usually 
look at such issues via lenses of their own mission, there is a tendency towards a rather narrow 
expertise and lack of a holistic vision. 
This project approached the current critical situation in the Moldovan society and its most likely 
implications through this much needed holistic perspective. It aims at “sincere” and unbiased 
assessment of the country development framework, shaping country’s policy agenda and 
promoting policy solutions to the problems arising from the internal and external challenges, 
e.g. global economic, environmental and energy crisis, defi cient governance, extremely weak 
democracy and drawbacks in economic development. Apart from being a logical follow-up of the 
2007 State of the Country Report, this report will also draw conclusions from defi ciencies noticed 
already in previous issue and will show their implication in current crisis. Last, but not least, this 
project aims at analyzing what infl uences Moldova’s development as a state and advancing 
innovative policy solutions to Moldova’s core problems aﬀ ecting its development as a state.
Drawing on the previous State of the Country Report, this Report is much more focused and 
is structured in six core chapters. In the fi rst chapter we analyze Moldova’s endowment with 
the resources necessary for any country to prosper and compete with other nations: labor, 
technology, infrastructure and natural resources. What policies have Moldovan governments 
adopted to overcome the country’s natural weaknesses and how successful these policies 
have been in supporting country’s economic growth is the subject of the second chapter. 
The third chapter is dedicated to a strategic analysis of the domestic political environment in 
Moldova, starting with deciphering the main dividing and uniting lines within the Moldovan 
society, going to political participation, welfare situation and ending with analysis of how 
robust is the rule of law. Further on in the fourth chapter we attempt to analyze the foreign 
policy of Moldova from the perspective of main constraints and determining factors of both 
domestic and foreign nature, including the very fl uid geopolitical environment in the region. 
In chapter number fi ve we outline the four major global risks likely to aﬀ ect the Moldova’s 
development in near and more distant future: global economic crises, climate change, scarcer 
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and dearer food, and eventual global energy run-out. Based on this analysis, the fi nal chapter 
draws the policy implications and makes recommendations to the Moldovan government. The 
appendix includes the analysis of the sociological survey “Moldova 2009: state of the country 
and of the people” commissioned by the Expert-Grup as part of this project to the IMAS-INC 
company.
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1. Moldova 2010: assessing country’s resources for development
For a country to prosper and compete with other nati ons, a sound and constantly developing economic 
basis is necessary. Economic development is ulti mately a long-term social process encompassing the 
growth of country’s producti ve capaciti es by using the resources the country can att ract or is endowed 
with. Various factors propel economic growth, but ulti mately it depends on availability and eﬃ  cient 
combinati on of labor, technology, physical infrastructure and natural resources. While geographic and 
natural factors fall under the God’s responsibility, availability and eﬃ  cient use of the other factors is the 
result of the governmental policy and of some longer-term social and economic changes. This chapter 
analyzes how well Moldova is endowed with all these resources.
Ambivalent role of geography and nature
Starting with the endogenous endowment, it has to be said that the geographic situation of 
Moldova is more a burden for its development than an asset. Below we are looking at Moldova’s 
main geographical parameters, endowment with basic natural resources and with energy and try 
to scrutinize some of the myths related to Moldova.
Geographic and demographic situation
One overplayed myth is that Moldova is strategically located between Western and Eastern 
economic poles and this location could be used to develop a strong logistics sector serving 
international trade. However, with all its transport and customs infrastructures problems, 
Moldova is presently everything but a logistics node. Looking at the Europe’s map, one sees clearly 
that Moldova is landlocked, peripheral and far from bridging the West with the East. While some 
other European countries are landlocked either (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, 
or Belarus), they are more central in terms of continental transportation routes and trade fl ows. 
Moldova stretches only 340 km on the 1200 km long land stripe between the Black Sea and the 
Baltic Sea. The country is truly sandwiched by Romania and Ukraine. The latter has 1150 km border 
with the “West” (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania), while Moldova - only 450 km (with 
Romania). Ukraine has 16 functional airports and a dozen others that can become operational for 
international cargoes and 18 large sea and river ports. Moldova has only 3 functional airports and 
one small sea-river port. Combined with low-quality roads, slow railway and an unsettled political 
confl ict with the Transnistria breakaway region this makes Moldova economically “remote” and 
unattractive as international transit route. To some extent, Moldova could be seen as a transit 
route for the land transportation fl ows between Balkans and Ukraine/Russia, but most of the 
international carriers prefer after entering Romania from the West or South to take a bit up North 
and enter Ukrainian territory immediately rather than crossing Moldova. This objective assessment 
of the geographical size and location implies that Ukraine by far outperforms Moldova when it 
comes to bridging the West with the East. Because of this size disadvantage, Moldova will have 
to invest much more than Ukraine and to provide a much better business and trade environment 
in order to become truly attractive as international logistics center.
Resources for development
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Moldova’s geographical location is strategically important more in terms of military than of 
international trade. The Dniester and Prut rivers are natural barriers between other two much 
bigger barriers: the Carpathians Mountains and the Dnieper river. With Romania becoming a NATO 
member, hosting four US military bases and other military facilities and declaring recently to oﬀ er 
its soil for location of interceptors as part of the US ballistic missile defense system, Moldova’s 
geostrategic importance only grows. However, this should be more an issue of concern rather 
than of pride, because this practically means that a potential military confl ict between Russia and 
NATO would be fought on the Moldovan territory. Protecting this territory without siding with 
any actor involved in a potential confl ict and without entering active military operations requires 
either an internationally recognized neutrality status for the country or much stronger military 
capabilities to defend it. Another strategic option for Moldova would be joining NATO but this 
has a very weak support among Moldovan population and represents a contentious issue inside 
the political elite. This also means that Russia would prefer to remain present in Transnistria for 
good rather than to withdraw its troops and munitions in any foreseeable future.
Another myth is that with the Giurgiulesti port becoming operational in 2007, Moldova has 
fi nally become a maritime country. There is little doubt that the Giurgiulesti port will be quite 
successful project and others will try to replicate it elsewhere in Moldova by developing land-
based international logistics hubs. However, the privately-managed Giurgiulesti port has 
presently limited operational capacity of transporting only oil products, grains and passengers 
and is compatible only with small sea and river-going vessels. The Danube River can become for 
Moldova a key transport venue to/from Europe and to/from Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria 
and Turkey, but to make eﬃ  cient use of it Moldova has to develop much further the Giurgiulesti 
port and to make its territorial deals with Ukraine irreversible. Because of the border constraints, 
developing the Giurgiulesti port further is possible only upstream the Prut river but this requires 
additional investment which may not be feasible in the near future. 
Small size of the country is frequently invoked as one of its advantages to solve quickly its core 
problems and eventually to get rapidly integrated into EU (as opposed to Ukraine which as size 
is 18 times larger). Also, Moldova has many natural sites of scenic beauty, a reference for those 
willing to make Moldova a tourist destination. However, small is beautiful only if it is tidy. To 
any foreigner getting outside the capital area, Moldova leaves an impression of a rather messy 
country, with people and administration showing little care about public goods and community 
welfare. If being small is advantage why then Moldova has not been able for two decades to get 
at least clean if not rich?
Moldova is densely populated, with about 116 inhabitants per km2, which generates a considerable 
pressure on the environment. While this indicator practically matches the EU-25 average, this is 
much above other countries in the region; Bulgaria has 69 inhabitants per km2, Romania – 94, 
Ukraine - 751. That would not be a problem in itself if Moldovan population would be mainly 
urban. However, most of the Moldovan population is rural and this brings us to a truly diﬃ  cult 
problem, which is the high density of small rural communities in Moldova. Only 9 out of the 1545 
communities in Moldova have more than 20 thousand inhabitants. According to our estimates, 
more than 55% of total population leaves in communities with less than 5000 inhabitants each, 
and about 11% - in about 700 tiny rural communities with less than 1000 inhabitants each2. This 
dispersion of small rural communities poses enormous problems when it comes to providing 
basic utilities and physical infrastructure to these communities. No surprise, in 2009 about 41% of 
the Moldova’s citizens did not have access to running water, 55% - to sewage system, and 47% - to 
natural gas pipeline3. At the beginning of the 21st century, more than half of the population of this 
1 EUROSTAT statistical database;
2 Expert-Grup estimates based on the Moldovan governmental “Devinfo” database;
3 According to the results of the sociological survey “Moldova 2009: state of the country and of the people” conducted for Expert-Grup 
by IMAS-INC Chisinau;
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European country still uses wood stoves and latrines as part of “normal” life. These shortcomings 
are only magnifi ed by the weak administrative and policy capacities of the local administration 
and uncooperative nature of relationship between the central and local governments.
Soils and water
With agricultural land representing more than 74% of Moldova’s territory (50% on average in 
EU-25, but 71% in Ukraine and 60% in Romania), agricultural resources are certainly among the 
most important natural resources of the country. Fertile soil of Moldova is often quoted as being 
its main fortune. About 73% of the total arable land is the so-called chernozem, a type of soil 
containing very high share of humus and with high productive capacity1. These indicators suggest 
that the country’s economy will probably always rely on agricultural sector more than most of the 
transition countries. This also means that Moldova is naturally very well endowed to ensure its 
own food security and even to become an important regional exporter of food. 
However, with its exceptional soils, Moldova pleaded for international support to withstand the 
2007 drought. Therefore, the advantages of this agricultural endowment are neither constant 
nor absolute. Firstly, the quality of the Moldova’s black soil has worsened in the last four decades, 
and this was mainly because of the man-made causes. Presently, one quarter of the total land 
area suﬀ ers of some form of erosion. On the aggregate soil quality scale ranging from 1 to 100 
points, the rating of the Moldovan soil declined from 70 points in early 1970s to 63 points in 20082. 
With the rate of decline speeding up since mid-1990s, in about 20-30 years Moldova’s soils quality 
will get from superior to average. 
Secondly, Moldova has never been able to convert the high fertility of its soils in something more 
palpable, such as high income for its farmers. In fact, yields in Moldova have been constantly 
under-par by the regional standards, although the EU-15 and CEE countries have soils of lower 
quality (Chart 1).
Chart 1 Basic crops yields, 100 kg per hectare, % of EU-15 average, 2008
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1 UNDP Moldova, “National Human Development Report 2009. Climate Change in Moldova: Socio-Economic Impact and Policy Options to 
Adapt”, Chisinau, November 2009 (hereinafter NHDR, 2009);
2 NHDR, 2009;
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Furthermore, the high quality of Moldova’s black soil is not unique in the region. In fact, Moldova 
is only a small part of the bigger Chernozem Belt stretching from Southern Romania to North-East 
Ukraine and further to Southern Russia. Both in Ukraine and Romania the quality of soil matches 
the quality of soil in Moldova, but the two other countries have much vaster arable land and are 
therefore more attractive for international or domestic investors preferring to make economic 
benefi ts from the opportunities provided by the large-scale agriculture. Finally, the land – which is 
the most valuable asset of Moldova, with a total market value that we estimate at 5-6 billion Euros 
– has never been part of the normal economic circuit. After two decades of economic reforms, 
the land market still remains dysfunctional and unattainable for the foreign investment as non-
residents are prohibited by law to purchase agricultural land.
Despite its location in temperate latitudes, Moldova has surprisingly small water resources, and 
these can further deplete as global warming advances. In popular perceptions, there is “a lot” 
of water in Moldova; hence, it is not carefully used. An indicator of this little care is the share of 
the losses associated with water transportation in total water withdrawals growing from 1.2% in 
1980s to 4% in 1990s and 7.4% in 2000s1. However, expressed in per capita terms, there are only 
about 1700 m3 water resources available in Moldova and this represents only 50% of the Ukrainian 
level and 25% of the Romanian one. A signifi cant risk is that only 1/3 of the available water volume 
is from local resources, while the rest comes from the two trans-border water streams crossing 
Moldova (Dniester at East and Prut at West). While presently the water use level is quite small 
(1.4% of the total stream volume), the main risks are those related to potential cross-border 
environmental disasters. In the recent past Ukraine has shown little care for the environmental 
issues and little willingness to cooperate with Moldova on them; indeed, the regional fl oods in 
2008 have been mainly an outcome of this lack of cooperation. A technological disaster on the 
Dniester River somewhere on the Novo-Dnestrovsk hydropower station would immediately have 
severe humanitarian consequences for downstream Moldova.
The limited resources of water are an especially signifi cant economic constraint for the present and 
future economic growth of the Southern and South-Eastern region of Moldova (conventionally, 
under the Leova-Cimislia-Grigoriopol line). The region which is almost entirely dependent on 
agriculture is already scarce in water resources. And the region’s irrigation needs are only likely 
to increase as climate is projected to get hotter and drier in the decades to come.
Besides limited quantity, the poor quality of water is another signifi cant problem that presently 
creates big costs for the industries relying on water and generates signifi cant risks for people’s 
health. About 90% of the country’s digging wells - which are main sources of water in all Moldovan 
villages - do not meet the potable water hygienic standards2. Also, the water from the Bic river 
(downstream Chisinau) and from Raut river (downstream Balti) is of very poor quality because of 
the discharges from the two big cities. Among other consequences, the poor quality of the water 
will hinder development of a “green agriculture”, as practicing it relies entirely on eﬃ  cient and 
non-oﬀ ensive irrigation schemes. If not abated, the problem of the poor quality of the water will 
continue draining even more public and private resources from economic development to health 
care needs.
Mineral and energy resources
In the last three decades Moldova has not been part of any complex program of geological 
prospection. However, there is no doubt that Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe 
and CIS in terms of exploited/proven mineral resources. Traditional energy resources (such as oil, 
gas, coal) are practically absent with some small amounts of poor qualities and low economic 
1 Expert-Grup estimates based on NHDR, 2009;
2 NHDR, 2009;
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value available in Southern region. These will remain only of local importance unless deeper 
geological prospects prove bigger reserves. Metal ores are missing as well (except some tiny iron 
ore deposits close to Soroca town). 
Moldova has quite large reserves of non-metaliferous minerals used mainly for production of 
construction materials and ceramics. However, so far these resources have had limited role in 
producing internationally tradable goods (except, occasionally, cement). If properly explored 
and with more advanced processing technologies applied, these resources could be converted in 
internationally competitive construction materials and new composite materials.
According to oﬃ  cial sources, Moldova has some deposits of rare and valuable mineral resources 
that are not yet industrially exploited1. Some examples of such deposits are: tripoli, which is a 
perfect natural abrasive used for polishing and cleaning of jewelry and fi ne crafts; diatomite and 
bentonite that are widely used in many industrial fi ltering applications and as industrial adsorbents; 
helium which can be used for various cryogenic applications; the subterranean brines discovered 
during oil and gas-fi elds prospection in Southern region and which can be used to eﬃ  ciently 
extract iodine, bromine and rare earths. Numerous sources of potable and therapeutic mineral 
water are not eﬃ  ciently exploited either. However, for all these resources to be economically 
employed the legislation on natural resources has to be streamlined and private capital be more 
welcome in exploiting the mineral deposits.
The lack of own energy resources is a core, truly geopolitical, problem for Moldova. This implies 
that, unless some technological breakthroughs happen, the country is set to remain dependent 
on other countries and there are quite limited options for Moldova to get rid of this dependency. 
Our estimates based on oﬃ  cial sources2 suggest that Moldova has the necessary natural potential 
to cover only up to 10-12% of its energy needs by 2020 from renewable energy resources provided 
that it improves two-fold its energy eﬃ  ciency. However, it is clear that this option is not a panacea 
and Moldova is likely to remain a net energy importer in the foreseeable future, especially if 
economy restarts growing faster than expected. Since lack of own energy resources is one of 
the main Moldova’s weaknesses, this is the reality that any meaningful national security strategy 
should consider. In long term, shortage of energy resources, especially of the electric energy, and 
the acute energy ineﬃ  ciency are the key constraints for the country’s economic growth.
Labor: quantitative losses, any quality gains?
From economic point of view, labor is a much more valuable resource than other production 
factors. Quantity of available labor depends on fundamental demographic trends. However, 
available labor resources can be determined by other factors as well. For instance, the general 
social-economic environment in the country can either attract immigrant labor or rather push the 
country’s citizens to migrate abroad, and thus increase/reduce labor force. Also, at some point 
in time on the country’s development path for the younger cohorts of the population continuing 
education can become a more attractive option than entering the labor market immediately after 
completing compulsory education. 
Another side of the labor resource is its quality, which changes slower than the labor quantity. 
The quality of the labor is mainly a long-term outcome of governmental policy in the areas of 
youth and adult education, but it also depends on how technologically advanced is the country 
in general.
1 Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Republic of Moldova “State of environment in Republic of Moldova in 2006. National 
Report”, Chisinau 2007;
2 Government of Republic of Moldova, “Draft of the National Program for use of renewable energy resources for the period 2006-2010”;
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In terms of quantity of available labor resources Moldova has grown rapidly after the World War 
II, but it suﬀ ered a series of severe blows after inception of the economic transition. Separation 
of the Transnistria region in 1991-1992 reduced by 12% the labor manpower eﬀ ectively available 
for the Moldovan economy in transition. Meanwhile a robust brain-drain started as well. Our 
estimates based on some oﬃ  cial1 and academic2 resources suggest that by mid-90s Moldova 
has lost about 1000 highly-trained scientifi c and engineering staﬀ  that migrated abroad. Then, a 
massive jobs’ shedding followed due to the industrial and agricultural restructuring. An important 
part of the highly-skilled laborers and specialists converted to „alternative occupations”, such as 
marketplace vendors or builders. The apex of this labor drain has been the mass emigration of 
the labor that set on in 2000-2001 after the Russian fi nancial crisis boiled down to the bottom of 
the Moldovan economy. All in all, between 1990 and 2008 Moldova lost 846 thousand workers, 
or 40% of the 1989 level. Normally, that would be an outcome of a war rather than of an economic 
transition. Migration has also made many Moldovans unmotivated to work because of their high 
reservation wage, propped up by the easily available migration option. All these refl ected in a 
dramatic fall of the employment rate. In fact, over the last two decades Moldova has suﬀ ered 
the most dramatic loss of labor force in the group of transition countries, as suggested by the 
evolution of employment rate (Chart 2).
Chart 2 Employment rate in 1991 (% of population aged 15-59) and absolute change 
in 1992-2007, percentage points
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2 UNDP Moldova, “National Human Development Report 1995”, Chisinau 1996;
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Have these absolute losses of the Moldovan labor been compensated by an increased quality of 
the remaining workforce? Yes, but only to a limited extent, as suggested by the labor productivity 
dynamics (Chart 3). In 2000-2008 labor productivity has improved, and in relative terms, Moldova 
has registered the fastest growth of the labor productivity among the charted countries. Despite 
this strong growth, as absolute performance the Moldovan workers were in 2000, and remained 
in 2008 the least productive in the group of the CEE and Western CIS countries. Some illustrative 
comparisons follow: Moldovan workers are 5.6 times less productive than the front-running 
Hungarian and Slovakian counterparts, 3.2 times less productive than Romanian workers and 45% 
less productive than Ukrainian ones. This comparison should dismantle another Moldova-born 
myth related to its “industrious work force”. Moldovans are indeed very hard-working but very 
little productive at the same time.
Ultimately, the low labor productivity is the key factor of income poverty of citizens and of the 
poor economic development of the country in general. Increasing the labor productivity should be 
a key objective on the working agenda of any reasonable government in Moldova, regardless its 
ideological or geopolitical orientation. And the labor productivity should continue growing faster 
than in other countries in the region if Moldova is to achieve any visible income convergence 
with the more advanced transition countries during a generation lifetime. But how can such a 
performance be achieved and maintained?
Chart 3 Labor productivity, PPP-adjusted USD per employee per hour, current prices
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Labor productivity is determined by a number of factors, but the most important are professional 
skills of the labor and the productive capital that this labor uses. As there are no direct indicators 
allowing international comparisons of the labor force skills, one has to look at some general 
education indicators in order to try to fi gure out some meaningful ideas about the level of 
skills.
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Table 1 Comparison of education enrollment rates and public expenditures for education, 2007
CEE 
countries**
CIS 
countries*** Moldova Ukraine Romania
Age-specifi c enrolment ratio of 
children aged 7-14 years* 97.8 96.3 90.7 97.8 95.7
Upper-secondary education 
enrolment rate 88.6 55.8 47.9 57.8 88.8
Students in post-secondary 
education, per 10000 inhabitants 22.7 88.0 87.6 25.7 21.1
Students in University education, 
per 10000 inhabitants 388.6 414.7 344.1 609.1 421.5
Public expenditures for education, 
% of GDP 4.5 4.6 8.0 6.2 4.7
Note: * - children enrolled in diﬀ erent levels of education as per cent of population aged 7-14; ** - Commonwealth of 
the Independent States hereinafter includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; *** - Central and Eastern Europe hereinafter includes Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia.
Source: 2009 edition of the TransMONEE database, prepared by the UNICEF Regional Oﬃ  ce for CEE/CIS;
Surprisingly, Moldova invests in education much more public resources than other transition 
countries, about 8% of the GDP (4.5% on average for the 26 transition countries for which data for 
the year 2007 are available1). Besides, an important amount of private resources enter education 
through oﬃ  cial or unoﬃ  cial payments (bribes, contributions to repair works, handbooks rent 
and others). Apparently, this massive public and private spending has failed to have dramatically 
positive educational outcomes. In fact, educational enrolment rates in Moldova are low by 
regional standards (Table 1), except the enrollment in post-secondary education. Even more, the 
enrolment in primary education declined over the last decade by about 7%. This education levels is 
critical for the educational outcomes at later stages and therefore for the labor productivity. 
Another essential weakness of Moldova is its rather low level of enrollment in university education 
(leaving apart the poor quality of the education graduates receive in engineering and management 
fi elds, which are of critical importance for any economy). This fi nding is opposite to the persisting 
stereotype that Moldova has too many University students and that the Government should 
channel a part of the youth to lower education levels (especially to the vocational one, which is 
presently in a completely disastrous situation). As a matter of fact, Moldova needs even more 
of its youth to graduate universities and to apply the skills inside the country. But at the same 
time Moldova needs a more optimal structure of the fi elds (with more emphasis on agriculture, 
technology and management) and a higher quality of studies, as well as overhaul of its system of 
vocational schools. Both of these ends can be achieved by allowing reputable foreign universities 
and vocational schools to enter Moldova, creating an eﬃ  cient and impartial system of academic 
and vocational accreditation, monitoring closer the inputs aﬀ ecting the quality of education and 
by increasing the Universities’ and vocational schools’ autonomy while rendering them more 
publicly accountable.
Investment: widening the gap with central Europe 
Capital investment infl uences both the quantity of the productive capital and its level of 
technological progress. Historically Moldova has suﬀ ered a chronic shortage of capital investment. 
After the World War II signifi cant investments were made in all economic and infrastructure sectors 
1  2009 edition of the TransMONEE database, prepared by the UNICEF Regional Oﬃ  ce for CEE/CIS;
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(including heavy investment in military-industrial sector). But because of the faults of the Soviet 
planned economy, overinvestment in technologies with military purpose and due to the supply-
chains often sprawling over the whole USSR, a big share of the created productive capacities 
was at odds with the economic logic that reasserted itself in the wake of economic transition. An 
important part of this productive capital became useless once the Soviet Union fell apart. 
Additionally, after becoming independent, Moldova made a strategic error of only gradually 
allowing private and international investors to purchase/invest in state-owned companies. In 
fact, in the early transition period Moldova was a laggard in comparison with both CEE and CIS 
countries in terms of capital investment, with a detrimental impact on the productive capacity of 
the economy (Chart 4). 
Chart 4 Gross capital investment, index 1991=100%
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Because of the constant underinvestment the country’s productive capital and physical 
infrastructure rapidly worn out during 1990s. In 2000 the real capital investment matched only one 
quarter of the 1991 level, but the total stock of the productive capital was even smaller because of 
the technological depreciation that we have not accounted for because of lack of statistical data. 
As of 2008 the annual capital investment was only 41% of the 1991 level. Ukraine has followed 
broadly a similar evolution, while Romania registered one of the most dynamic growths of the 
capital stock. In Moldova, an important part of the investment went to constructions, real estate 
and fi nancial sector, i.e. in sectors producing non-tradable goods and thus with little impact on 
the country’s international competitiveness.
Lack of investment capital refl ected, among others, in the rapid degradation of the public 
infrastructure, especially of the automobile roads. With roads receiving less than 20% of the funds 
necessary for their maintenance, in 2006 only 10% of the total roads network were assessed as 
being of good or fair quality. According to respected international sources, Moldova has the 
worst roads and one of the worst railways among all transition countries1. Because of the low-
1  World Economic Forum, “Travel&Tourism Competitiveness Report 2009”, available at http://www.weforum.org;
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quality roads, we estimate that economic costs of transport inside the country are from two to 
three times higher than the physical distances would suggest.
By and large, Moldova’s technological gap with Central and Eastern European countries widened 
during the transition period, while its traditional competitive advantages and markets were lost. 
Presently Moldovan companies are discovering new advantages and are trying to penetrate 
new markets. Some studies report that at least in case of some companies these eﬀ orts are 
monumental and that many Moldovan companies are quite competitive given the current level of 
country’s economic development. Whether these eﬀ orts will succeed or not in long term depends 
not only on what companies do, but also on what the Government does through its policy. 
As a net assessment to conclude this chapter, it is clear that Moldova commands a poor 
endowment with natural resources as compared other countries in the region. However, even 
existing resources are not adequately used and some of them, such as land and water, risk 
extensive degradation and depletion. One of the transition outcomes in Moldova was big losses 
of labor force, mainly because of the migration. But Moldova has done very little to maximize the 
productivity of the remaining labor. Finally, country’s productive capital, including key transport 
infrastructure, has rapidly worn out because of constant underinvestment. With an ill-defi ned 
and constantly changing business regulatory environment, Moldova has frightened rather than 
attracting domestic and international investors. Next chapter is dedicated to analysis of the 
Moldova’s economic policy and how this policy aﬀ ected country’s capacity to provide prosperity 
for its citizens using the resources available. 
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Economy policy for development
2. Moldova’s economic growth: “bold” government, weak economy
Previous chapter showed that Moldova is a country relatively poor in mineral, energy and investment 
resource. Its human resources have depleted as well because of the on-going labor migration and poor 
quality of the education services. This chapter will analyze what policies have Moldovan governments 
adopted to overcome these weaknesses and how successful they have been in supporting country’s 
economic growth. It starts with an overview of the transition main outcomes and then looks at how 
the country competed as player in the international trade. At this background, impact of the global 
fi nancial crisis on Moldova is assessed.
Moldova’s transition progress in nutshell
Two basic indicators are used to assess and compare countries’ economic growth. The GDP 
growth assesses how strong economic growth has been over a certain period of time. The GDP 
per capita ratio (based on the Purchasing Power Parity) highlights how a country fares in terms of 
its population’s wellbeing. The two indicators show that Moldova has yet a very large gap to close 
with other transition countries and this gap has only widened in the previous two decades. As 
highlighted in Chart 5, the CIS as a region recovered to the 1992 GDP level by 2003, while Moldova 
was close to recover its 1992 output only in 2008. As all existing literature shows, the labor 
migrants’ remittances have been the main driver of the economic recovery in Moldova through 
supporting the private consumption. However, with a 7% decline of the real GDP estimated for 
20091 and a rather slow 1.5% recovery expected for 2010, it is clear that the global fi nancial crisis 
has put an end to Moldova’s recovery. Moldova’s path mirrors the evolution of the Ukrainian 
economy, while the other neighbor, Romania, has enjoyed a much stronger growth.
The slowness of economic recovery has dramatically aﬀ ected the people’s wellbeing, lowering 
Moldova’s poverty rank in the group of the transition countries. In 1992 its PPP-based GDP/capita 
was only 1777 USD and this was the bottom fi fth position among all transition countries. By 2008, 
when Moldovan GDP reached its transition maximum, the country’s GDP/capita was only 2983 
USD and this was the bottom third position among all CIS and CEE countries2. True that Moldova 
managed to drastically reduce the poverty incidence rate from about 70% in late 1990s to about 
30% by 2004, but this progress was achieved against a very modest national poverty line (about 
50 USD per month). More important, in 2005-2008 the poverty almost stopped falling while in 
2009 it grew again due to the fi nancial crisis and economic recession.
1 Presentation made by the Deputy Prime-minister of the Republic of Moldova, Minister of Economy, Mr. Valeriu Lazar, at the roundtable 
“There are good chances for the economic stabilization turning to economic growth” on February 4, 2010, http://mec.gov.md/node/1856.
2 Expert-Grup estimates based on the IMF World Economic Outlook Database;
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Chart 5 GDP growth, index 1992=100%
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Worth mentioning, after 2005 there was insignifi cant reduction of poverty in rural areas, 
while urban poverty declined steadier. With the modest inter-sector relocation of labor force 
that we have seen so far and dysfunctional social protection system, it seems that from now 
on a signifi cant reduction of poverty incidence in Moldova will be possible only if a sustainable 
economic growth is achieved in the agricultural sector. The latter employs about one third of 
the labor force and provides at least partial subsistence means to about half of the population. 
In the longer-term perspective, however, reduction of poverty will be possible only with more 
rural labor being employed in non-agricultural activities. In the early transition period agriculture 
bore the brunt of unsuccessful economic reforms, while under the communists’ governance 
it was the victim of a completely fl awed policy. The sector evolved from a constant economic 
recession in 1990s to stagnation in 2001-2008. As result, agriculture downgraded from being the 
most important economic sector in mid-1990s to a minor one nowadays (Table 2). Manufacturing 
sector has followed a broadly similar path, and this was mainly because of the drastic shortage of 
capital investment in the productive capacities and in the R&D activities.
Table 2 Structural and absolute dynamics of the Moldovan economy
Share in GDP, % Share in employment, %
Share in total 
exports revenues, %
average annual production 
growth, %
1995 2009e 1996 2009e 1997 2008 1995-2000 2001-2008 2009
Agriculture 33.0 8.7 42.8 32.5 15.3 11.7 -0.6 -0.1 -9.8
Industry 28.2 15.6 11.7 12.3 68.6 53.9 -4.0 7.6 -22.2
Constructions 4.0 5.2 3.3 6.8 - - -10.3 18.0 -30.7
Services 34.8 72.3 42.2 48.4 16.1 34.5 8.1 12.1 -3.8
Sources: NBS, NBM and EG estimates and calculations;
After the drastic collapse in 1995-2000 the constructions sector experienced the fastest growth 
in 2001-2008. Its share on the labor market doubled, while its contribution to GDP increased from 
4.0 to 5.2%. But this growth reversed when in 2009 the real estate bubble imploded as result of 
falling remittances which in the past have fed a signifi cant proportion of end- and speculative 
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demand for the real estate. Emergence of services as Moldova’s main economic sector is the 
only truly positive economic development in the last decade and half. The net result of this bogus 
“economic modernization” has been a massive outfl ow of Moldovan citizens to foreign labor 
markets. Moldovan migrants have been among the Moldova’s most competitive exports so far.
Starting with 2005-2006 the economic growth exhibited obvious symptoms of overheating. The 
real estate price rose rapidly without any similar trend in the revenues of the population. Bank 
credit in 2007 grew about 52%, while the current account reached -16% of GDP, and worsened even 
more in 2008, -17.3% of GDP. Even if no international crisis occurred in 2009, a domestic one would 
eventually hit the imbalanced Moldovan economy.
Economic policy of the “bold” government
Despite liberalization rhetoric, the quintessence of the Moldovan political economy thinking in 
the last two decades was quite simple: the government has to control as much as possible and 
to lead the economy because entrepreneurs are either helpless or ill-intentioned. The practical 
application of this philosophy has been a vast, corrupt, pervasive and ineﬃ  cient system of state 
control bodies and a crony system of public administration. The net result of this has been the 
repression of private entrepreneurship and intertwining of political goals with economic interests. 
Ever growing migrants’ remittances provided the necessary turf for the government to fi ll its 
coﬀ ers by taxing consumption: in 2008 taxes on consumption (VAT and excises) provided 66% of 
the Moldovan state budget (45% in Ukraine and 57% in Romania).
During its long-lasting economic transition Moldova has implemented a string of successful 
reforms (such as macroeconomic stabilization, prices liberalization) but a number of critical 
reforms addressing structural and institutional weaknesses of the economy have been 
abandoned mid-way or completely ignored. To mention only one of the most important failures, 
Moldova has been a laggard among other European transition countries in implementation of 
regulatory and enterprise reform. As most other transition countries, Moldova has completed 
rather successfully the privatization of the small enterprises. But a real problem for Moldova 
is the ineﬃ  cient functioning and lack of industrial and management restructuring of the large 
manufacture and service companies, including many public utilities. Most of these big companies 
continue operating under Soviet industrial standards and old management practices; they are 
not publicly accountable and are ultimately a drain of budgetary funds, thus locking in vast 
human resources and impeding country’s economic development. Two typical examples are 
“Moldtelecom” (state-owned telecommunications services provider) and “Caile Ferate ale 
Moldovei” (railway transport company): both companies have used the key infrastructure they 
own in ways prohibiting development of private services providers. Use of state-owned public 
utilities for achieving political purposes has been a recurrent practice in Moldovan politics. At the 
same time, many market institutions are either missing or feeble: for instance, National Agency 
for the Protection of Competition has been set up only in 2007 but the agency remains weak 
and ineﬃ  cient. Equally important, the country’s judicial system has been chronically unable to 
enforce rule of law and protect fi rms, investors and employees rights. Growing share and number 
of Moldovan plaintiﬀ s reaching European Court for Human Rights and claiming economic justice 
is the most telling indicator of this poor law enforcement.
A rent-seeking regulatory system was put in place in Moldova generating corrupt practices, 
rising transaction costs and thus making the country even less competitive in attracting foreign 
investments. To give only a typical example, for a domestic or foreign investor to build an 
agricultural products’ storing/processing facility near the fi eld it will take, in the best case, about 
one year while the government adopts decision of changing agricultural destination of the land 
and another year to get the construction permit. Moreover, Moldova has been the place of 
completely wicked practices when, for an investor to invest in a given community/district, the 
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mayor/district authorities would demand a bribe rather than providing necessary support to the 
investor. Moldovan government tried to improve the investment climate in ad-hoc manner rather 
than on systematic basis. The most monumental of these eﬀ orts was adoption of the zero-rate on 
the reinvested corporate income since January 2008. The then-president Voronin explained his 
decision by necessity to create an attractive environment for the domestic and foreign investors, 
even though the business surveys at that time were clearly showing that main problems were by 
no means those related to income tax burden but rather high costs of fi scal administration1.
Chart 6 Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in 1989-2008, USD/capita
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Because of this quagmire of regulatory malpractices, in the last two decades Moldova was not 
able to attract/generate necessary investment resources in order to make use of its most valuable 
resources, land and human resources. Moldova has been one of the worst performers in Central 
and Eastern Europe in attracting FDI (Chart 6). As result, Moldovan private companies represent 
today a rather depressed and weak sector, generating only 65% of the GDP. This is on a par with 
Belarus and Central Asia countries with a poor record of economic reforms, but very low when 
benchmarked against most of the European transition countries: 70% - in Slovenia, Romania, 
Latvia; 75% - in Poland, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Bulgaria, Croatia; and 80% in Slovakia, Hungary, 
Estonia, Czech Republic.
1 See for instance the World Bank “Doing Business 2008”, available at www.doingbusiness.org. 
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Assessment of the macroeconomic environment 
After the macroeconomic chaos in early 1990s, Moldovan governments have promoted sounder 
macroeconomic policies. As a testimony of the improved fi nancial discipline, in 2000-2008 the 
general government balance in Moldova (on average -0.3% of GDP) was much better than on 
average per group of transition countries in the same period (-1.3% of GDP). Running such small 
defi cits was not an exaggerated fi scal discipline, taking into account that infl ationary pressures 
in Moldova (13.3% as yearly average in 2000-2008) were higher than in other transition countries 
(10% on average per period for all transition countries). Also, Moldovan government was not 
credible enough to easily access international fi nancial markets in order to cover potentially larger 
defi cits. Despite the relative fi scal balance achieved, fi scal risks for the Moldovan government 
remained high because of imprudently high fi scal commitments: in 2008 the share of total public 
expenditures in GDP reached 41.6%, while for 2009 it was projected at 46.8%. Wages contribute to 
both high level and substantial increase in public expenditures in 2009, while investments had a 
depressed share in total expenditures. Such levels of budgetary commitments are more common 
to the wealthier transition countries rather than to the low-income ones (Chart 7). At the end of 
the day, overexpansion of the public sector resulted in crowding out of the private one.
Little surprise that for Moldova the immediate impact of the global fi nancial crisis was the budget 
defi cit escalating from -1% in 2008 to -9% in 2009, as the government was not able to radically cut 
its high level of spending at the background of plunging revenues. With a very high shortage of 
domestic resources to cover both fi scal and external imbalances, Moldova is set to rely largely on 
the IMF and other international fi nancial institutions and donors in the next 2-3 years.
Chart 7 Governmental spending (% of GDP) and GDP/capita (current prices, PPP-based), 2008
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High, double-digit, infl ation was another routine feature of the Moldovan macroeconomic 
environment during the entire transition period save the year 2002 when prices grew 5.2% on 
yearly average. The anti-infl ation policies were not as tight as declared, and in fact the National 
Bank of Moldova had no clear-cut monetary policy strategy and no eﬀ ective tools to counter 
infl ation growth. On the other hand, the government had admitted accumulation of more than 
evident price distortions: food in Moldova became unbelievably expensive for a country with 
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“agricultural traditions”, while the prices for services, particularly for housing services, central 
heating, water and transport services were artifi cially kept below cost-recovery levels. Repressing 
price adjustments, especially in energy sector, contributed to accumulation of a high level of 
private foreign indebtedness, which created risks of turning out public if debtors turn insolvable. 
In January 2010 the services tariﬀ s was more or less adjusted; but downward adjustment of the 
food price is yet to be accomplished.
All in all, in the last decade, the consumer prices in Moldova grew more than two-and-half times 
(more exactly 261.5%, see Table 3), with some services and merchandises registering much higher 
growth rates. The table below shows also the top-10 consumer services and goods that contributed 
the most to the CPI growth starting with those having the largest contribution (as they all have 
diﬀ erent shares in households’ expenditures, smaller price increases may have translated in 
bigger net eﬀ ects on general CPI). Their combined eﬀ ect on the CPI growth is 47%. The implication 
of the table below is the following: besides the classical argument of monetary base expansion, 
other factors that have driven high infl ation in Moldova in the last decade were weak markets 
competition (meat, medicines, fi sh until recently), poorly performing local industries (fruits) and, 
especially, growing imported energy price (hot water provision, gas provision, central heating 
and passenger transportation). 
Table 3 Price indexes in Moldova, 2009, index 1999=100%
2009
Consumer services 266.3
Food stuﬀ 256.4
Non-food merchandises 254.4
Consumer Prices Index (CPI) 261.5
including, main contributors to CPI growth
meat and meat products 452.0
medicines 375.3
clothes 271.1
hot water provision 1280.4
hygiene and cosmetics 315.2
gas provision 389.7
fruits 747.1
sugar 270.6
central heating 346.3
passengers transportation 340.4
Sources: NBS; EG calculations;
It is diﬃ  cult to imagine how a standard monetary policy based on neoclassical theory would 
reverse rise in production costs due to the country’s energy dependency, make agriculture more 
eﬃ  cient or get rid of anti-competitive market arrangements. Countering in long run the infl ationary 
pressures in the economy requires therefore not only the standard monetary tools but also a blend 
of structural and institutional policies to make markets functional and economy more energy 
eﬃ  cient. And for the monetary policy itself to be eﬃ  cient and Central Bank signals embedded in 
the commercial banks behavior, the country needs a much more developed fi nancial system. 
Financial sector reaping fruits of economic growth
Financial systems have a central role in promoting economic growth by oﬀ ering investment 
resources needed by companies, and by fi nancing mortgage schemes and long-term consumer 
expenditures. This is why it is important to have a look at whether and how Moldovan fi nancial 
system contributed to the country’s economic growth.
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Moldova has a rather underdeveloped and opaque fi nancial system, even though it was rather 
stable and not subject to any severe crisis in the last decade. Despite its creation back in mid-90s 
and its institutional correspondence to the Western standards, the national capital market plays a 
less than negligible role in fi nancing companies’ investment needs. Insurance services and micro-
fi nancing organizations are as depressed as the capital market.
Banking system is the main pillar of the Moldovan fi nancial system, with total stock of banks loans 
representing a little more than 41.6% of the country GDP in 2008 (Chart 8). However, this is a very 
low level of fi nancial penetration even for the low standards of the transition countries (where the 
group average in 2008 was 67.5%). Main part of the capital investments in Moldova – more than 50% 
in 2008 and 58% in 2009 after banks rationalized the credits even more – is fi nanced by companies 
own profi ts, which is an unusually high indicator. The 2009 fi nancial crisis had a severe impact of 
fi nancial situation of the Moldovan companies and most of them will not be able to fi nance their 
investment plans on their own. This is why, besides attracting more foreign capital, Moldova needs 
to get its banking system at least as functional as before the crisis in order to provide necessary 
investment resources. Otherwise, the economic recovery will be a lengthy and diﬃ  cult one. The 
main problem is that banks themselves are presently in a diﬃ  cult situation either.
Chart 8 Financial depth and ownership of the bank sectors, 2008
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The Chart 8 suggests that share of foreign ownership of the banking system may partially explain 
the low level of bank loans provision in Moldova. Poor access to cheaper external fi nancial 
resources and lack of access to more advanced banking management know-how certainly was an 
important factor in keeping real interest rates high.
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However, low share of foreign banks ownership in domestic ones is only one part of the story. 
Indeed, despite recent arrivals of some foreign banks on the Moldovan banking sector, the interest 
rates have shown little reduction. The other part of the story is the low level of development of 
business culture, as many directors of local enterprises have a very poor understanding on what a 
business plan is and how is it elaborated and used to get a loan. Moldova was home to completely 
vicious practices of bank oﬃ  cers often writing business plans for the loan-takers. Banks themselves 
have had a poor diversifi cation of risks. As result, the 2009 fi nancial crisis has more than doubled 
the share of non-performing loans in total banks assets. Therefore, the banks themselves are 
presently short of resources for providing long-term loans. Despite rising thorny issues related to 
economic and fi scal justice and to moral hazard, it is clear that solving the node of accumulated 
non-performing loans in commercial banks is key to resuming a more sustainable economic growth 
in Moldova. Solving that node does not necessarily mean saving banks with public money – an idea 
diﬃ  cult to accredit politically – but rather a clear time-schedule of sorting bad credits out with clear 
commitments from all parties involved and likely with some money from the part of the EU banks. 
Getting such infl ows from the EU development banks is not as insurmountable as it seems, because 
the Moldovan banking system is presently defi nitely less troubled than those in other countries 
from the region. However the commercial banks should devote more time, resources and marketing 
imagination to win the public confi dence, which is quite low presently. As our sociological survey 
shows, the balance of popular trust in commercial banks as of end 2009 was still rather negative: 
32% of the public having trust in banks against 44% not having trust.
A key aspect for ensuring consolidation of the fi nancial system and hence for providing economy 
necessary investment resources is for the National Bank of Moldova to educate through its policy 
more public trust in national currency. Despite the quite respectable age of the national currency 
(Moldovan Leu entered circulation in November 1993), the public has yet a very low level of trust in 
it. Fundamentally, this is proven by the high level of bank deposit dollarization (41.1% of total in 2008 
and an outright 50% in 2009). On occasional basis, the low trust in currency provides the material 
for social nervousness when the Leu temporarily depreciates against dollar or euro. Because the 
currency is ultimately an attribute of state sovereignty, low trust in currency inevitably erodes trust 
in the government and state. Therefore, the recent adoption of direct infl ation targeting by the 
NBM is a right step in the right direction, but, as shown above, this requires more complementary 
reforms to address structural imbalances and low competitiveness of the country.
Looking for a niche in the global economy
With a negligibly small share in the global output (0.018%) Moldova is a typical example of a very 
small economy lacking any means to infl uence the regional and global economic environment. 
At the same time, Moldova is an open economy deeply integrated into the global trade fl ows: 
its foreign trade equals about 110% of its GDP. Moldova is not anymore as trapped into the 
geographical concentration of its trade as it was in early transition; this holds for both exports 
and imports (Table 4). In fact, the current geographical distribution of the Moldovan trade is very 
close to the balance predicted based on the international trade gravity theory.
In long term, Moldova has also achieved a certain degree of products diversifi cation, both for 
exports and imports (Table 5). The country departed from the traditional structure of exports 
dominated by low-value agricultural products, but presently its exports are dominated by textiles, 
more advanced in terms of labor payment but still not very advanced in terms of technology and 
marketed brands and derived revenues (most of the textile companies operating under the so-
called lohn-agreements). However, the fi rm progress of some higher value exports (chemical 
products and plastics, metal articles, construction materials, machines and equipment) show that 
the country is fi nding also some more profi table niches on the international markets. 
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Table 4 Geographic structure of Moldova’s foreign trade, % of total
Exports Imports
1997 2008 1997 2008
Russia 58.2 19.7 28.4 13.6
Ukraine 5.7 9.0 18.0 17.1
Other CIS 5.7 10.5 5.1 4.7
Romania 6.7 21.1 8.6 12.1
Germany 3.7 4.0 8.1 7.4
Italy 2.7 10.5 4.1 6.3
Other EU 8.1 15.9 17.5 17.2
US 6.7 0.9 3.5 1.9
Switzerland 0.2 2.5 1.1 0.6
China 0.0 0.2 0.1 6.6
Turkey 0.6 2.1 1.2 4.7
Other countries 1.7 3.6 4.2 7.8
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: NBS and EG calculations
Nonetheless, with merchandise imports four times bigger than exports in 2008, and service 
imports matching exports, it is obvious that Moldova’s trade integration into the global economy 
is utterly unbalanced; actually this is one of the most unbalanced trade structures in the group of 
transition countries (Chart 9). This is not an incidental issue, but rather a deeply-rooted economic 
trend persisting since 1997 and posing signifi cant risks and limits for the country economic 
development.
Table 5 Product structure of Moldova’s foreign trade, % of total
Exports Imports
1997 2008 1997 2008
Live animals and animal products 8.6 0.6 1.9 2.0
Vegetal products 8.6 13.2 3.2 3.4
Vegetal and animal oils and fats 1.0 4.0 0.4 0.4
Food, beverages, tobacco 54.8 19.6 7.5 7.0
Mineral products 0.4 4.0 35.3 23.0
Chemical products 1.5 2.1 9.6 8.5
Plastics, rubber and articles thereof 0.6 2.4 3.1 5.7
Leather, furs and products thereof 1.4 2.1 0.3 0.7
Wood and wood products, except furniture 0.1 0.3 1.7 1.8
Cellulose, paper, paperboard and articles thereof 0.4 1.1 4.1 2.4
Textiles and articles thereof 6.7 19.7 5.3 5.8
Footwear, hats, umbrellas and other similar products 0.7 3.0 0.3 0.6
Articles of stone, gypsum, cement, glass and other similar materials 1.4 3.3 3.9 2.8
Common metals and articles thereof 1.0 7.5 4.4 7.6
Machines and device; electric equipment 5.2 10.5 12.9 15.6
Transport means and materials 5.9 1.0 3.0 8.0
Optic, photographic, medical tools and devices; watches; other similar products 0.4 1.8 1.7 1.5
Other goods 1.4 3.8 1.3 3.0
Total, million USD 874.1 1591.2 1171.2 4898.8
Source: NBS and EG calculations;
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Chart 9 Merchandise exports and imports, % of GDP
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There are two underlying causes behind this negative trend. The most oft-cited is that since early 
transition Moldova experienced a constant worsening of its terms of trade (Chart 10), meaning 
that the country’s exports are becoming less valuable in comparison with the imports by price. 
After a 70% growth in 1994-1998, the Moldova’s terms of trade worsened slowly but steadily. 
Even more, according to our estimates, Moldova’s terms of trade have fared worst by transition 
countries standards.
But the second reason – accelerated growth of the physical volumes of imports and sluggish 
growth of exports volumes – has been more important. For a country whose imports exceed 
80% of the GDP and a signifi cant part of these are vitally important intermediary imports (electric 
power, fuel, gas, industrial equipment) or fi nal consumption goods (food), Moldovan exports 
appear too small as total quantity and too cheap in order to provide the necessary currency 
infl ows to pay for the imports that have grown at an outstanding pace. No surprise, the current 
account has been under constant pressures, going from -8.1% of GDP in 2005 to -16.7% in 2008. 
The economic recession in 2009 alleviated the tensions which are expected to remain subdued 
in the mid-term.
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Chart 10 Evolution of Moldova’s terms of trade, exports and imports physical volumes, 
index previous year=100%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Exports, physical volume Imports, physical volume Terms of trade
Source: NBS and EG calculations;
As a net assessment, aside Ukraine and Georgia, no other transition country has suﬀ ered such a 
dramatic economic decline and such a slow recovery as Moldova. Against most of the transition 
countries, Moldova has made very little economic progress since USSR demise. As much as policy 
is concerned, the string of Moldovan governments lacked a strategic and thorough approach to 
Moldovan development and the vision how to use the country’s endowment. Economic stagnation 
is refl ected in the poor quality of infrastructure, meager living standards and intense emigration of 
people from both rural and urban settlements. Broadly, Moldova was not able to make use of its 
natural endowment and human resources and to overcome its structural weaknesses. The most 
signifi cant drawback is Moldova’s inability to get rid of its patchy regulatory environment and 
to attract and retain foreign (as well as domestic) investments. The economic growth achieved 
between 2000 and 2008 ended when its main engine – migrants’ remittances – contracted. 
Financial markets are still feeble and unable to provide the much necessary investments at a 
reasonable cost. With its exports growing rather slowly and imports mostly concentrated in 
non-substitutable items, the country has also suﬀ ered from a rapidly worsening terms of trade. 
The bottom line conclusion is that the true economic modernization of the country is yet to be 
achieved and unfortunately, if it proceeds at recent pace, this task will span over many electoral 
cycles if not decades.
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3. Domestic policy: cyclical motion
This chapter is dedicated to a strategic analysis of the domestic political environment in Moldova. It 
starts with an exercise of deciphering the main dividing and uniting lines within the Moldova society. 
Further on it is shown how this complex identity background corroborated with generalized public’s 
dissatisfaction in politics to explode after the elections of April 5, 2009. The very low living standards 
provide the fertile terrain for accumulation of social discontent. At the end of the chapter it explained 
how low political culture and political apathy combined with power vertical resulting in the rule of 
law being replaced by the rule of party after 2001 and what implications that has for the state. 
…”A house divided against itself shall not stand”…
The Republic of Moldova, as well as its territory, has had a very tumultuous evolution; hence 
its complex historical, cultural, and identity background. If employed rationally, this complexity 
can serve as a source of country’s development and modernization; if it is used to ill ends, it can 
hamper country’s development and social cohesion.
Obviously, in such a fragile and immature society as Moldova’s it should not come as a surprise 
that this complex nature provides fertile ground for dividing lines periodically re-emerge in 
Moldovan social realities and public discourse. These dividing lines are quite diverse in nature and 
come across ethnical, linguistic, religious venues; they also transcend into domestic and foreign 
policy preferences. The roughly equal division of the parliamentary seats between the Alliance 
for European Integration and Party of Communists and protracted stalemate to elect the country 
president are an eloquent example of this. The table 6 below shows the overall picture in a 
schematic and generalized manner, but it can serve as a convenient tool for fi guring out where the 
most of dividing lines are positioned. When the gaps brought into life by exploitation or political 
manipulation of the dividing lines are getting too wide the formulation and articulation of the 
national consensus is hardly possible. Conversely, the attempts to force “identity solutions” or 
“national ideas” concocted by some quarters of political elites upon opposing groups, are often 
met, sooner or later, by harsh political backlashes and even extreme political swings in opposing 
direction.
It is astonishing how persistent these lines have been and how easily they have fuelled social 
animosities throughout the last decade or so. Furthermore, these dividing lines have been often 
deftly exploited by various quarters of the political elites for shifting public attention from core 
and universal problems to sector or group ones. However, this is hardly surprising when one 
examines closely the factors that infl uence public opinion. Diﬀ erent parts of Moldovan society 
have increasingly opposite domestic and foreign policy leanings; they watch absolutely diﬀ erent 
TV stations, read diﬀ erent newspapers and even being Christian Orthodox they go to diﬀ erent 
Metropolitan Churches. Certainly, this is not meant to say that Moldova’s citizens should watch 
the same TV or read the same newspapers. The problem is that there is too little communication 
between main society’s groups who often live in distinctively diﬀ erent realities, while respective 
media and churches do regretfully little to narrow those dividing lines. At the same time, although 
it is hard to gauge, growing share of Moldovan citizens relies on having second or even third 
D o m e s t i c  p o l i t i c s
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citizenship (Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, etc.). It becomes increasingly hard to see 
what keeps these people together. What is the glue that should hold these diverging parts 
together? Is Moldovan citizenry an historic accident after all?
Table 6 Main dividing lines of different backgrounds, schematic overview
Main 
spoken 
language
Ethnicity (self-
identifi cation)
Domestic policy 
leaning
(Parliamentary 
parties)
External policy leanings Church
Mostly 
watched 
and trusted 
media
Romanian/
Moldovan
Romanian Liberal Party (PL), 
Liberal Democrat 
Party (PLDM), less 
Alliance for Our 
Moldova (AMN)
Pro-EU, pro-NATO, often 
pro-re-unifi cation with 
Romania
Bessarabia 
Metropolitan 
Church, Romanian 
patriarchate
Romanian 
and local 
Moldovan Party of 
Communists 
(PCRM), Democrat 
Party (PDM), AMN, 
PLDM
Varying and combining: 
Pro-EU, balanced policy and 
close ties with Russia;
Anti-NATO, anti-re-
unifi cation.
Sensitive to any “Romanian 
incursion” that might, 
in reality or imagination, 
jeopardize Moldovan 
statehood. Sometimes 
nostalgic about Soviet Union.
Both Moldova 
(service in 
Romanian 
language) and 
Bessarabia 
Metropolitan 
Churches
Local, 
Russian and 
Romanian
Russian Russian, 
Ukrainian, 
Gagauz, Jewish, 
Bulgarian, etc.
PDM,PCRM , much 
less AMN and PLDM
Varying: openly pro-Russian, 
moderate pro-Russian and 
pro-Ukrainian leanings, 
moderately and openly pro-
EU, slightly more nostalgic 
about Soviet Union
Moldova 
Metropolitan 
church, Moscow 
patriarchate 
(except Jewish 
community);
Russian, 
local
Source: EG;
Certainly such a situation is not something especially new for new states formed in the wake of 
demise of “empires”. Indeed, many post-Soviet and Balkan states have had to deal with blurred 
identities and historical legacies in the process of consolidating their statehoods. However, 
most of these nations had a sort of internal “ideological” anchor, a feeling of “us” as opposed 
to “them”; and even if this principle has not been shared by all of the citizens of newly formed 
states, at least those societies managed to forge a core segment in them. In its turn, this core was 
able to put forward and promote a common “national” vision and idea of what the new state 
should look like and to what it should aspire. 
Furthermore, these new states usually did not have clear-cut components that could be attributed 
or attached to bigger geopolitical (and ethnically akin) entities and with which considerable parts 
of society could associate themselves. In other words, many countries did not have external 
“geopolitical” anchors powerful and attractive enough to tear that country apart.
In this sense, Moldova appears to have gone full cycle. After almost two decades of independence 
the pro-active core citizenry able to formulate and promote “national and civic” vision is 
nowhere to fi nd. Instead, botched eﬀ orts to “forge” homo moldavicus, as an ethnically separate 
Moldovan identity opposed to the Romanian one, at the expense of civic identity have apparently 
compromised the self-identifi cation and statehood altogether. The principle “ethnical identity 
fi rst, civic identity second” has undermined the natural course of formation of the civil core needed 
for articulation and promotion of vision and national ideas on which the statehood foundations 
are to be laid. In other words, Moldovan citizens identify themselves along the ethnical lines (alas, 
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dividing them) and only after that, if ever, by civic ones (that unite them). A well-documented 
analysis of the classical dichotomy of the civic versus ethnical identity can be found in Gabriel 
Andreescu’s “Nations and Minorities”, which is summarised in the Table 7 below.
Table 7 Civic-based versus ethnic based national legitimization
Civic-based Ethnic-based
by law by common roots (blood)
by elections by inheritance (nepotism)
rational choice emotional choice
unity by consensus unity by status
democratic pluralism ethnic majority rule 
freedom brotherhood
persons makes nation nation makes person 
Source: Gabriel Andreescu’s “Nations and Minorities”, Polirom, 2004;
To make situation even more complex, in this state- and nation-building process Moldova has had to 
face oﬀ  two powerful geopolitical actors (one more actor can be added further on), akin ethnically 
to relatively important shares of population and whose part Republic of Moldova happened to 
be in diﬀ erent periods of past: Romania and Russia. Although both states declaratively recognize 
and support Moldova’s independence, lingering fears and doubts about the sincerity of their 
intentions endure as well as do vociferous social groups aspiring to (re)unifi cation in one form or 
another. Besides that historical memories, cultural and blood bonds maintain attractiveness of 
the respective “metropolis”; quite naturally, this attractiveness becomes more conspicuous in the 
process of successive policy failures by Moldovan domestic political class. So long as Moldovan 
state will not be able to deliver on its basic obligations of personal economic and physical security, 
political and human rights’ protection, to facilitate and provide venue for political expression and 
participation aimed at consensus-seeking, and to respond to fundamental aspirations of its people 
so long the evolutionary forging of the “ideological” and “geopolitical” core will elude to occur.
Political participation: the story of disillusioned stakeholder...
One of the major frailties of Moldovan state is its continuous inability to meet expectations of 
its people and to ensure that they have their say in the political process. Most of the sociological 
surveys1 reveal unremitting public dissatisfaction with the path followed by the country and the 
way it is governed (Chart 11).
Besides brief episode in the beginning of 2005, the number of those who thought that country 
was moving in the right direction never exceeded that of citizens thinking the country was 
heading in wrong direction. 
At the same time people have had the feeling that their views are not taken into account and 
they eﬀ ectively lack any say over the policy issues both on local and national levels (Chart 12). 
Moreover, less than one quarter of Moldovans believe the country is governed along with 
people’s will, while more than half believe exactly the opposite2. Such a situation may lead either 
to political apathy (lack of interest towards policy and lower participation in political process) or 
to social unrest and street protests3. 
1  This trend is also supported by data from “Moldova National Studies” under IRI auspices as well as survey “Moldova 2009: state of the 
country and of the people”, conducted as part of 2009 State of the Country Report Project.
2  Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, November 2009;
3  Worrisome trends became easy to observe much earlier, see also State of The Country Report 2007, Expert-Grup, 2008.
37
Chart 11 Distribution of answers to the question “Do you think that our country 
is moving in right or wrong direction?
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Chart 12 Share of citizens who think they can infl uence to a signifi cant degree 
important decisions taken at the national and local level
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More or less both of those could be observed in Moldova throughout recent years. On average, less 
than quarter of Moldovans expressed substantial interest in domestic politics up to parliamentary 
elections of 20091 (Chart 13).  At the same time, the voter turnout was in continuous decline since 
parliamentary elections of 27 February 1994 to 5 April 2009 from 79.31% to 57.55%, only to budge 
a little bit upwards in July 2009 elections to 58.77%. Moreover, both IPP and IRI surveys show 
subdued numbers of those who believe elections in Moldova are free and fair. The latest BPO 
survey shows roughly equal shares of those who believe and who do not believe elections are free 
and fair: 42.3% vs. 42%, respectively2. Rubbing salt in a wound, the trust towards political parties 
which are supposed to be main bearers of people interest in public politics was at historical lows 
in the recent years: only around 15% of Moldovans did trust political parties in 2007-2008, while 
the parties were the least trusted institution in Moldova in that period3. 
In its turn, social protests in the period preceding April elections of 2009 were generally focused on 
some very specifi c and sensitive issues related to certain broader or narrower social groups with 
topics ranging from history and language issues, to status of Transnistrian region and business 
patents holders. In a way they were not bearing systemic character or representing fundamental 
challenges to incumbent government. 
Thus, an extremely divided society “enriched” with such ingredients as generalized public’s 
dissatisfaction in politics and suppressed opposition groups, fl avoured with pre-electoral 
manipulations, aggressive electoral campaigning, unfolding economic meltdown and alleged 
electoral fraud, was ready to explode. And so it did. The post-election events in April 2009 
shattered all the illusions regarding state of Moldovan democracy and governance; it also showed 
how fragile and polarized Moldovan society is. 
Chart 13 Distribution of answers to the question: “How much are you interested in politics?”
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1 See also “Moldova National Study, November 10-25, 2008”, IRI.
2 Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, November 2009;
3 Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, November 2009;
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The street protests, accompanied by marauding of two main state buildings1, are not exactly the 
attributes of the normal democratic process. Nonetheless, there are some positives to be taken 
anyway. The April events appeared as a systemic challenge to the incumbent power by those 
dissatisfi ed with political process, whose political grievances were suppressed during last couple 
of years. At the same time it served as a rude awakening for “contemplating” majority that self-
detachment and apathy are not necessarily the way to improve their lives: Moldova was back in 
nineties grasping air for solutions of the same existential issues.
The period that followed the April 2009 events and especially the period preceding repeated 
elections in July of 2009 showed increased public interest in politics at the background of ever 
more divisive electoral campaign2, higher voter turnout and even higher level of trust in political 
parties as institutions. In a sense this reveals both the fact that acrimonious electoral campaign 
and transfer of power rekindled dividing spirits in Moldovan society, but also a new hope. The 
fact that power is held by the alliance of parties, and is not a show run by a single party, is both a 
risk and sign of positive changes requiring ability to maintain dialog and communication between 
partners with diﬀ erent and even opposite views on a series of the issues.
In order to build on the momentum, and there are signs that it may start fading quite soon, the 
Alliance needs an explicit set of “common” priorities to be embedded into agenda and to be 
implemented. At the same time, the renewed hope for more participation should not be wasted. 
The participatory process encompassing business associations, non-governmental organizations, 
academia, etc., should be fi lled with substance, while people in general need to have the feeling 
of “ownership” in the country’s development. Failure to deliver it again main mean the country 
could enter just another cycle.
Unsuccessful welfare state
Welfare policy is not a secondary issue for the purpose of our analysis. Moldova is a poor country 
and the use of public resources for achieving social welfare and improving living standards of the 
population tells a lot about the country’s domestic politics. More over, there are a number of 
welfare-related arduous issues that infl uence the current policy; and they will do even more so in 
the future.
With a very weak private entrepreneurship and a vast rural and graying population, Moldovan 
society was poised to manifest leftist political preferences and to exaggerate the paternalist 
expectations from the part of “the state” in the last two decades. Responding to this social 
mood, the Constitution provides that Moldovan economy is a market-based economy with social 
orientation. It also provides for many other social guarantees in the area of education, health and 
labor. With all these provisions incorporated in the supreme law of the state, one would expect 
Moldova at least to converge towards if not to be a welfare state. However, policies adopted in 
Moldova responded little to the real needs of the country. As result, people’s welfare very little 
changed since inception of the economic transition.
Surveys conducted in Moldova in the last decade or so reveal a constellation of issues that Moldovan 
population confronts with. Some of these problems seem to have been addressed and are 
therefore declining in the gamut of the people preoccupations; for instance, while in August 2000 
crimes level was a concern for 28% of the country population, it was so only for 10% in November 
20093. Similar declining trends can be observed for a number of other social concerns, such as 
famine, war, natural calamities, and diseases. But a few of existential issues have permanently 
frightened the Moldovan citizenry: poverty, prices, unemployment and children future (Chart 14). 
Some of them have only become more prominent lately, such as prices and unemployment. 
1 The competent investigation is yet to shed light on the April 2009 protests and preceding alleged (pre)electoral fraud; 
2 The incumbent party excelled with its “Protect our Motherland!” campaign, which actually backfi red against the Party of Communists;
3 Institute for Public Policy, Barometers of the Social Opinion, various issues;
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Chart 14 Most prominent answers to the question “What problems are you mostly afraid of?”
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Table 8 Distribution of the answers to the question “Which answer better describes 
your household’s situation in respect with the following public and housing services?”
I do not have 
access to this 
service 
I have problems 
with access to this 
service 
Most of the time I am 
satisfi ed of the access to 
this service 
I have full access 
to this service NA
Running water 40.6 6.4 7.4 43.0 2.6
Hot water 61.4 7.9 5.2 22.1 3.3
Sewage system 55.3 6.4 6.2 29.0 3.1
Gas 46.7 4.7 7.2 40.1 1.4
Roads 9.2 21.4 19.4 47.5 2.5
Electric energy 1.7 7.3 13.5 76.4 1.1
Thermal energy 58.4 5.0 7.7 23.8 5.2
Note: due to rounding oﬀ  the sum per rows may not necessarily total up to 100%;
Sources: IMAS;
Table 9 Distribution of the answers to the question “Which of the following technologies 
are present in your household?”
I do not have 
access to this 
service 
I have problems 
with access to this 
service 
Most of the time I am 
satisfi ed of the access 
to this service 
I have full access 
to this service NA
Landline telephone 19.2 2.2 10.4 67.4 0.8
Mobile telephone 38.0 3.8 6.1 49.2 3.0
Computer 62.5 5.8 3.8 23.2 4.7
Internet 65.9 6.9 3.4 19.0 4.8
TV set 6.9 7.0 10.4 74.5 1.2
Cable TV 19.2 2.2 10.4 67.4 0.8
Note: due to rounding oﬀ  the sum per rows may not necessarily total up to 100%;
Sources: IMAS;
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The sociological survey conducted for the purpose of this report has also underlined the low 
living standards persisting in Moldova (Table 8 and Table 9). It is really disappointing to notice 
that in the early 21st century most of the Moldovans still live like in early 20th century, i.e. without 
basic housing services, poor road connections, with problems in accessing electric power grid 
and less than negligible penetration of the digital technologies.
As roughly a half of the Moldovan citizens are still afraid of poverty, prices, uncertain future 
for their children, and unemployment, and more than half of them is missing access to modern 
day services and technologies, it is clear that fundamental needs of the population are far from 
being fulfi lled yet. This is particularly an issue for the country-side. With migration option easily 
available and villagers’ children receiving an education comparable to the urban ones allowing 
them to pursue urban-based careers, it is clear that quite many Moldovan rural settlements are 
doomed. Addressing these core issues has to be present as the overarching goal on the agenda 
of any benevolent government in Moldova. Otherwise, such a destitute and ignorant population 
could be (and in fact was) an easy electoral prey for any unscrupulous domestic political party or 
foreign encroachment.
Between the rule of law and the rule of party
Since its independence back in 1991 Moldova has tried countless reforms with the declared 
purpose of consolidating the democratic institutions and rule of law. Moldova has also adhered 
to many international treaties requiring the government actively enforce the rule of law, 
democratic values, human dignity, human rights and liberties. Despite this, Moldova remains 
an outstanding laggard in all important international ratings assessing the progress of the post-
communist countries in practical implementation of these standards. Quite a relevant indicator 
in this regard is the number of complaints addressed to the European Court for Human Rights 
against Moldova that constantly increased in the last decade. The 3350 applications fi led in 
against Moldova pending before a judicial formation on December 31, 2009, made the ECHR 
label Moldova as a “high case-count state”1. With 3.70 cases allocated for trial per 10000 country 
inhabitants, Moldova is “outperformed” only by Georgia (5.03), Liechtenstein (3.92) and 
Montenegro (4.30).
But more than any international rating and quantitative indicator, public perceptions regarding 
the functioning of the democratic institutions and the rule of law are those that should matter 
the most for a meaningful government. Suggestively, about 6% of the country citizens perceive 
that none of their rights is adequately protected in the Moldovan society, while other 42% 
of the citizens believe that most of their rights are not respected; for about one quarter of 
the Moldovans “it is diﬃ  cult to say” unequivocally whether or not their rights are adequately 
respected (Chart 15). Answers to the question “in case that your legitimate rights would 
be violated, do you believe that the justice in our country would protect you” are similarly 
distributed (Chart 16), serving as a key testimony for the low level of public trust in Moldovan 
justice system.
1 European Court for Human Rights, Analysis of Statistics 2009, report downloaded at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/89A5AF7D-
83D4-4A7B-8B91-6F4FA11AE51D/0/Analysis_of_statistics2009.pdf
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Chart 15 Distribution of the answers to the question “Do you generally believe 
that your rights are respected in the Moldovan society?”
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Chart 16 Distribution of answers to the question “In case that your legitimate rights 
would be violated, do you believe that the justice in our country would protect you?”
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More than anything else, the political year 2009 could serve as the litmus test for the status of the 
“rule of law” in Moldova. In 2009 parliamentary elections were held on April 5 amid widespread 
allegations of the unfair campaign and rigged outcomes. The parliament was dissolved after two 
failed rounds to elect the country’s new president and early elections took place on July 29. Some 
international organizations, including the OSCE, claimed that the parliamentary elections were held 
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with no major electoral fraud1, but these claims refer mostly to the technical part of the elections, 
i.e. to the voting itself. The OSCE statement acknowledged that numerous infringements of the 
voters’ rights took place through use of administrative tools, subtle or overt intimidation of mass-
media and opposition parties, and heavy involvement of the state security apparatus in favor of 
the Party of Communists. A grand coalition of domestic observers ascertained many frauds and 
irregularities before and during both April and July parliamentary elections and outright declared 
that both elections were not correct and only partially free2.
Following the April 5 elections, peaceful demonstrations against the electoral frauds commenced 
on April 6. They continued on April 7, but this time some parts from within demonstrators turned 
violent and vandalized the Parliament and Presidency building. The events were qualifi ed by the 
then-ruling Party of Communists as Romania-inspired attempt of coup d’état. While there were 
clear evidences that violence against police and looting of the state buildings ultimately had 
an organized character, it is not yet clear who the organizers and executors were. Inadequate 
protection of the public buildings and inadequate handling of violence by the security forces 
was followed by violent response from the part of the police and other forces on 7 and 8 of 
April 2009. The way how youth and adults have been haphazardly arrested (minors seized in 
schools, people arrested on the streets, during nights, in public transport, by people wearing civil 
clothes, with no explanation of the arrest reasons, remote places chosen for their detention) 
shows that security forces acted as a repression apparatus and not as a law enforcement one. 
More than that, the reprimand character of the security forces surfaced in the way how arrested 
people have been treated in detention (with use of tortures, isolation, psychological violence, 
and reported cases of rape). Many apprehended persons had no access to lawyers, were denied 
the right of communicating with their relatives and were forced to self-denounce. Most of them 
were penalized with administrative arrests (for up to 10, 20 or 30 days), but a signifi cant part of 
the trials were held directly in the police oﬃ  ces with little respect for a fair trial procedures. The 
latter was culminating malpractice very much resembling those from the Stalinist era.
There are many open questions related to the April 2009 political violence and there are also many 
conclusions that can be drawn. We believe though that such issues as who fi rst threw the stones 
from the crowds, who were the people in black clothes commanding the mob, who hoisted the 
foreign fl ags on the Parliament and Presidency building, while important for those conducting 
public and legal inquiry, are nonetheless secondary for our analysis. Strategic analysis on the 
events that happed on April 7 and afterwards leads to a number of unpleasant conclusions.
Security system in Moldova is fundamentally fl awed, and this refers to all its institutional 
components. The basis of the system was designed in the Soviet era and it essentially inherited 
features of a political police. It is no surprise that only 3% of the people in Moldova feel that the 
security of their own and their family is adequately protected, while 23% believe that security is to 
a certain extent protected3. On the other hand, 24% cannot assess the status of their own and their 
family security, 35% believe that security is rather not protected, while 9% feel entirely insecure4. 
These perceptions are not incidental, as in the period 2001-2009 the security system in Moldova was 
basically used to protect Communists Party interests rather than providing for the state and society 
security. During and after April 2009 protests the security system has evidently acted coordinately 
to spread social fear and polarize the society using such tools as: closing down websites; using 
1 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Oﬃ  ce for Democratic Institutions and human Rights, “Republic of Moldova Parli-
amentary Elections of April 5, 2009: Election Observation Mission Final Report”, report available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odi-
hr/2009/06/38185_en.pdf;
2 Coalition 2009: Civic coalition for free and fair elections, Declarations and Press-statements, available at http://www.alegeliber.md/in-
dex.php/ro/declaratii-comunicate;
3 Results of the Sociological survey “Moldova 2009: state of the country and of the people” conducted as part of the State of the Country 
Report project.
4 Idem;
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telephone surveillance; widespread use of state control bodies as a oppressive measure against 
private entities and NGOs, interdiction for international mass-media representatives to enter the 
country; intimidation of journalists; heavy brainwash through communists’ aﬃ  liated TV and radio 
outlets; politically-biased declarations and media statements by the general prosecutor, minister 
of interior and head of information and security service; deporting Romanian ambassador and a 
minister-councilor; introducing visa regime for the Romanian citizens for the allegedly Romania-
inspired coup d’état. The show directors undoubtedly got their inspiration from the Orwellian 
novels.
The normal way for the Moldovan police is to act as a repressive rather than law-enforcement 
agency. Violence and torture was not an accidental way of police behaving against youth and 
adults arrested in connection with the April 7 events. Violence and torture, often in unimaginably 
brutal forms, was always used by the Moldovan police as a normal way of obtaining evidence1. 
Specialists are citing diﬀ erent causes of the pervasive use of torture of the people held in 
police custody, including political tolerance from the part of the Government, President and 
Parliament. We believe that the situation is much worse, maltreatment being an integral part of 
the institutional culture within the Moldovan police. Temptation is often high to blame the police 
violence as a habit inherited from the Soviet militia. However, in the Soviet times the militia was 
much less cruel that Moldovan police. Even more worrying, most of the publicly known cases of 
torture involve young policemen, which did not serve in Soviet times. Another suggestive fact 
is that violent behavior from the part of the police against apprehended people was explained 
by “psychological pressures”, which basically means that police is not adequately trained to 
perform its duties which by default involves withstanding constant psychological pressure. What 
is particularly worrying is that during April days not a single oﬃ  cer from the police denounced the 
illegalities committed. Such a corporate solidarity is particularly upsetting, as it basically means 
that there is a culture of oppression and a sense of impunity inside the system. 
Political independence and public accountability of the judicial and prosecution bodies were 
completely undermined after 2001. The Party of Communists and its political cronies have been 
very successful in saddling the judicial and prosecution bodies and using the justice system for 
own purposes. The most clear evidence on this is that prosecutors immediately followed the 
April 15, 2009 request of the then-president Vladimir Voronin to initiate a total amnesty of people 
held in custody in connection with April 7 events, even though the country president was not 
constitutionally entitled to provide such a universal amnesty. There is a widespread public 
perception in Moldova that judges and prosecutors are corrupt. Decisions of the judges are 
generally formulaic and little understood by the parties. While the government presently asserts 
that there is no political infl uence on the judicial system2, it is hard to believe that people that got 
accustomed to serve political interests rather than the law would immediately start enforcing the 
law indiscriminately and in a fair manner.
Key democratic institutions in Moldova are far from providing a true democratic environment for 
the political life. Moldova has been under constant monitoring of the Council of Europe since 
1995 and adopted many laws but materialized very little practical progress3. Electoral legislation 
(including the D’Hondt principle in counting seats and interdiction of electoral coalitions) contains 
severe restrictions aﬀ ecting political life. Lack of a meaningful voters’ register is the key obstacle 
that would permanently provide terrain for suspicions regarding rigged elections. Many public 
institutions, such as Central Electoral Commission and Audiovisual Coordinating Council, in 2001-
2009 were reportedly permeated with interests of the Communists Party and it is not yet clear 
1 Promo-Lex, “Human Rights and Democratic Institutions in the Post-Election Period in Moldova, April 6 - July 1, 2009”, Chisinau, 2009;
2 Minister of Justice of the Republic of Moldova, Mr. Alexandru Tanase, quoted by the “Timpul” magazine in the article “Justice: reformed 
and purifi ed”, February 8, 2010;
3 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “The functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova”, doc.11878, April 28, 2009;
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how they are operating presently. Public National Broadcasting Company Teleradio-Moldova 
transformed in the Party of Communists PR outlet and greatly manipulated the electoral behavior 
of the rural voters.
Last but not least, Soviet-time habits of “social alignment” and “political discipline” are still very 
infl uential in the Moldovan collective memory and behavior. Exponents of such attitudes do not 
need “rule of law” but rather “rule of party”. During the 2009 electoral campaigns staﬀ s of the 
state-owned companies were mobilized to participate at meetings with the PCRM and “to make 
the right vote”; trade-unions were calling upon their members to cast their vote for the PCRM-
enacted “stability and civil dignity”; social assistants were carrying PCRM political messages 
together with free-of-charge medicines and food.
All these shortcomings are the outcome of the unfi nished political reforms during the early 
transition which in most of the cases were exacerbated by the Party of Communists power vertical 
that was carefully built after its ascension to power in 2001. The political system in Moldova 
evolved from a parliamentary republic in a de facto authoritarian regime. However, the seeds of 
this perverse political system allowing one party to parasite an entire state fell on the fertile soil 
provided by the very low political culture and political participation of the Moldovan society.
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F o r e i g n  p o l i c y 
4. Foreign policy: searching for the right balance…
As for a small country, open to the infl uence of the major external players, the clear understanding 
of the desirable country’s goal is necessary, but not suﬃ  cient for Moldova. Therefore, the ability 
to navigate along the best possible path towards this goal is of paramount importance. In this 
sense, this chapter attempts to analyze the foreign policy of Moldova from the perspective of main 
constraints and determining factors of both domestic and foreign nature. Furthermore, this analysis 
looks at the context in which foreign policy decisions are to be made and what approaches to be 
taken to designing foreign policy decisions.
Foreign affairs…
As a small country situated on the wedge of two geopolitical centers of power Moldova is subject 
to a series of infl uences that have permeated the entire history of the country whether as a 
province of a bigger entity, or an independent state. These infl uences vary from economic and 
trade ties to linguistic and cultural connections. In the aftermath of Moldova’s independence its 
foreign policy was strongly infl uenced by this domestic complexity of the relationships with major 
eastern and western neighbors as well as historical and geopolitical contexts. By far and large, 
throughout these years Moldovan political establishment was unable to formulate a balanced 
foreign policy aimed at eﬀ ective promotion of the country’s national interests (which for most of 
the period were not even clearly stated) and, thus, Moldovan policy was erratic or “multi-vector” 
to dizziness, at best1.
At the same time along with various infl uences, Moldova can be seen as an area of geopolitical 
struggle between big geopolitical players. Roughly, the two major regional centers of power 
and poles of attraction have been so far: European Union and Russian Federation. On one hand, 
“identity” of European pole is strengthened for some politicians and social groups by Romania’s 
membership in it and, thus, a prospect of re-unifi cation in the European Family of peoples. The 
US, the most infl uential global player with signifi cant interests in the post-Soviet periphery, is also 
supportive of Moldova’s European orientation, which weighs heavily on the balance of power 
in the region. Nevertheless, US infl uence can be viewed as making EU option more complex, 
adding to it an Atlantist fl avor. On other hand, Russia’s “identity” is strengthened, again for 
some politicians and social groups, by persisting memories of relatively prosperous Soviet past. 
However, as it will be shown later, the public perceptions divide is not that clear-cut and the 
overall picture is quite blurred. 
The intertwined ties – foreign policy constraints
As it was mentioned Moldova is a small country open and susceptible to a series of infl uences and 
constraints of various, albeit quite palpable, nature. This section of analysis attempts to outline 
these factors.
1 Curiously, the public opinion is also quite uniformly divided on the eﬃ  ciency of Moldovan foreign policy, see “Moldova 2009: state of the 
country and of the people” survey conducted for Expert-Grup;
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Development of Moldovan economy is strongly dependent on the ties with both European and 
Russian markets. Both players are major Moldovan trade partners: together they make up for 
¾ of Moldovan exports and slightly over half of imports. Although the role of Russia, both for 
exports and imports shrank substantially in the last decade, this country still holds an important 
position for Moldovan exporters (Russia even advanced to the top position as export destination 
throughout 2009 on the country level). The wine embargo introduced by Russian authorities in 
March of 2006 had negative eﬀ ects on the Moldovan economy and shattered country’s wine 
sector. Generally, Russian market is vital for Moldovan agriculture, refl ecting historical traditions, 
slow modernization of the sector and high competition on the EU market. 
The level of Russian FDI entering Moldovan economy is quite low, reaching in the pre-crisis 2007 
about 10% of the total stock. However, substantial part of the EU FDI (66.5% in 2007) comes from 
countries with more loose fi scal legislation and thus it is diﬃ  cult to establish for sure the origins 
of that capital. At the same time, it is clear that signifi cant FDI investment from the EU brings 
with it closer intra-industrial integration and thus includes Moldovan subcontractors in the multi-
national chains. This process became more salient in the wake of the EU Eastern Enlargement.
The role of Russia is further strengthened by vulnerability of Moldova’s energy security. For 
Moldova natural gas is the strategic energy resource (44% of total energy consumption as for 2007), 
especially for households. The prominence of natural gas as energy resource is not a vulnerability 
per se, however, the fact that there is no foreseeable alternative to Russian gas is one. Accidentally 
or not, the new Gazprom’s gas price policy promoted towards the countries of the so-called “near 
abroad” coincided with new phase of Russian oﬀ ensive in the former Soviet Union (fSU) in the 
aftermath of the Orange revolution in Ukraine, preceded by the failure of Kozak Memorandum 
in Moldova. Since then the prices for gas imported from Russia (technically it is Kazakh gas) to 
Moldova were raised more than four-fold from 80 USD per 1000 m3 in 2005 to 320 USD m3 in January 
20101. Russia through its companies also holds signifi cant position in gas transport infrastructure 
and power production (for instance, Cuciurgan plant in the break-away Transnistrian region which 
supplies power to right-bank Moldova). Furthermore, Russian Federation often tends to employ 
the energy levers as power tools to accomplish its geopolitical goals and does not shy away from 
cutting oﬀ  the gas as Russo-Ukrainian winter spats showed. In this sense, Moldova’s energy 
dependency is a major constraint on its foreign policy. Not surprisingly some important steps have 
been taken in order to diminish this vulnerability, such as accession to the Energy Community 
Treaty2. However, signifi cant positive outcomes are rather mid- and long-term in nature, therefore, 
in the short-term these vulnerabilities will endure to a substantial degree.
The Moldova’s economic dependency on the EU and Russia does not stop here, however. For some 
years, labor migration and associated incomes drove Moldovan economy upwards by pushing up 
domestic demand and fi lling the coﬀ ers of the public budget. Before the global economic crisis 
peaked and its eﬀ ects felt on the labor migration fl ows, Russia and the EU held an overwhelming 
position as the preferred destination for Moldovan labor migrants (Table 10). 
Table 10 Moldovan migrants by destination, thousand persons, 2006-2008
2006 2007 2008
EU 91.2 95.1 88.2
Russia 192.5 210.8 191.1
Other 26.5 29.7 30.5
Source: Labor Force Survey, NBS.
1 Certainly, authors do not mean that Russia should subsidize the fSU economies with cheap gas; however the changes have often been 
dramatic and smacked of political revenge;
2 This accession is conditional upon fulfi llment of certain number of commitments by Moldova.
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At the same time, the incomes of the migrants in the richer EU countries tend to be higher and 
thus remittances sent home tended to be on average higher than those sent from Russia. In 2007 
the amount of remittances sent home by labor migrants reached a staggering number of 34.1% 
as share of Moldova’s GDP. In 2008 when the global crisis impacts started kicking in, this level fell 
to 31.4%, nonetheless remittances have remained an important economic and social factor for 
Moldova.
Furthermore, there are several other aspects where both sides have leverage of diﬀ erent 
degrees. 
First of all, it is Transnistrian confl ict since its any palatable solution implies Russian good will 
to exert pressure over the self-proclaimed authorities of the region. At the same time, EU has 
only observer role in the negotiation process and has appeared so far very reluctant/unable to 
intervene strongly in the negotiation process. Furthermore, protracted political crisis in Moldova 
made practically untenable any eﬀ orts in this process in 2009. Nevertheless, through joint border 
mission EU helped securing eastern Moldovan-Ukrainian border. All in all, the institutional limbo 
in which is the respective region infl uences negatively capacity of Moldovan authorities to take 
foreign policy decisions for a hypothetical “re-united” Moldova. 
Secondly, Russia has much more, if declining, media infl uence over the Moldovan population. 
Russian TV and newspapers are wide-spread in Moldova and enjoy high ratings. For instance, 
Russian “First Channel” re-aired in Moldova enjoys the status of the most watched TV channel 
along with the publicly owned Moldova 1; for 30% of Moldovans this Russian channel is the fi rst 
choice for information and the second for another 25.4%1. In other words, many Moldovans see 
the world through Russia’s eyes. Quite the opposite, the EU lacks such important media tools. The 
situation has been somewhat changing since linguistic legislation has become enforced and new 
important Romanian media players entered the Moldovan market, while some parts of governing 
Alliance are increasingly averse towards Russian media infl uence in the country. 
Thirdly, the EU relatively excels with respect to so-called soft-power. The EU as a whole is already 
the biggest development donor for Moldova (over 60 mln. Euros under the National Action 
Plan in 2008), while several EU states with pro-active role in Moldova, such as Sweden, Great 
Britain, Poland, also add to the foreign aid development budget. Many EU states as well as other 
Western donors also provide programs that support local development, human rights, media, 
etc. Additionally, the US is extremely important player in this sphere which is also helpful for 
consolidation of the European or generally pro-Western Euroatlantist option. Furthermore, 
pro-European vision which rests on the success of the European integration process eﬀ ectively 
dominates public discourse and intellectual debate in the country. In its turn, Russia cannot boast 
such success; its soft-power is toothless and is in the embryonic stage. In addition, Russia has not 
been able to provide its own vision that would not be a simple antithesis to the Western model 
and outlining its main vices. 
Fourthly, the role of Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova should not be underestimated. 
The Church in general is viewed as the most trusted institution in Moldova: as much as 80% of 
Moldovan trust it according to some latest polls2, while over 90% of Moldovan population are 
self-confessed Christian Orthodox3. There are two Metropolitan Orthodox Churches active in 
Moldova: the Church of Moldova (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Church of Bessarabia (Romanian 
Patriarchate). While it is hard to estimate the numbers of church-goers to any of the Churches, the 
Moldova’s Metropolitan Church holds bigger sway, not least because the Bassarabian Church was 
1 Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, November 2009;
2 Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, November 2009;
3 National Bureau of Statistics of Republic of Moldova, “Population Census 2004 data”, available at http://www.statistica.md/pageview.
php?l=ro&idc=263&id=2208;
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oﬃ  cially registered quite recently. Some polls also show higher level of trust towards the former 
church vs. the latter: 76% vs. 62% of favorable views and 10% vs. 20% of unfavorable1, respectively. 
The “church” issue is highly politicized with diﬀ erent parts of Moldovan political elite attending 
diﬀ erent churches2. The pro-active roles of Russian and Romanian Orthodox Church leaderships 
can also be seen as a soft-power tool shaping state of mind of Moldovan people.
Given this myriad of factors and constraints it is little wonder that not only Moldovan foreign 
policy was quite unclear about its goals, but also public perceptions towards these main centers 
of power is extremely convoluted and blurred. Apparently, Moldovan population is both pro-
European and pro-Russian at the same time. It sees Russia as the country that should be the 
main strategic partner for Moldova, much ahead of the EU, while at the same time majority of 
Moldovans would endorse accession of their country to the EU at the eventual referendum (see 
Chart 17 and Chart 18).
Chart 17 Distribution of answers to the question 
“What country should be the main strategic partner of the Republic of Moldova?” 
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Adding another twist to this picture, more than half of poll’s respondents believe that Soviet 
Union’s demise had adverse impact on the Republic of Moldova, 40% wish re-unifi cation of 
the “reformed” and “modernized” Union, and almost 44% of respondents would vote for “re-
unifi cation” at an eventual referendum with 16.3% being still undecided on the issue3. Furthermore, 
the most trusted foreign leaders for Moldovan population are members of Russian duumvirate: 
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev4.
1 International Republican Institute, “Moldova National Study”, Chisinau November 10-25, 2008;
2 At the same time in 2007-08 the issue of the date of Christmas celebration as well as Christmas tree installation in the central square of 
Chisinau became a bone of contention between then-in-power Communists and liberal mayor of the capital. As much as theatrical it was 
also revealing to which extent the polarization of Moldovan society has gone.
3 Institute for Public Policy, “Barometer of Public Opinion”, November 2009;
4 Idem;
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Chart 18 Distribution of answers to the question “If the referendum on Moldova’s 
EU accession were held next Sunday, would you vote for or against?”
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Source: Barometer of Public Opinion, IPP. 
The apparent enigma of such a double consciousness is perhaps better explained that Moldovans 
base their choices not on the spiritual or political values, but on material ones. In other words, 
they vote not with heart or even head, but with stomach. So Moldovans, on aggregate, are fi ne 
with both “Unions” irrespective of political and cultural values at the foundation of those. In this 
sense, Moldova is indeed a country at the crossroads, coy on which path to chose.
The fl uid international landscapes…
The fl uid and dynamic international context adds another variable to the equation determining 
Moldova’s foreign policy decisions. The strength of the constraints may be mollifi ed by relatively 
favorable developments of global and regional scale, and, conversely, adverse developments can 
magnify these constraints impeding in this sense achievement of the foreign policy goals. 
To make matters worse the uncertainties of international context has recently been quite 
conducive to magnifying constraints over the Moldovan foreign policy, especially with regards 
to European integration option. First and foremost, the situation of the main geopolitical actors 
with interest in the region has changed:
Weakened US involvement in the region
Basic elements: United States has been a main geopolitical actor in the post-communist region 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It played a key role in democratization, liberalization and 
“westernization” of this region as well as in establishing the regional security architecture as we 
know it now. US supported democratization and market reform in Moldova since its independence 
in 1991. The US has also tried to support the settlement of the Transnistrian confl ict that would be 
consistent with principles of Moldova’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The objectives of the 
US seem to be two-fold: (a) support Moldova’s democratization and modernization, possibly to 
the extent of fulfi llment of Moldova’s euro-aspirations; (b) counter-balance Russian resurgence 
in the region and block Russian attempts aimed at bringing Moldova back to the Russian hold. 
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Current context: The recent geopolitical developments are not particularly favorable to high 
US involvement in the region in general. The United States has got bogged down in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (there are all the signs that President Obama will make Afghanistan “his” war), with 
the US military presence to be signifi cantly increased in the latter1. Furthermore, the United States 
is increasingly preoccupied with the nuclear threat posed by Iran. On both Afghanistan and Iran 
dossiers as well as on war on terror and new agreement on reduction and limitation of oﬀ ensive 
nuclear arms to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1), the US needs Russia’s 
assistance either with security intelligence and logistics or political acquiescence for imposing 
stronger UN-endorsed sanctions, etc.2. However, the relations between the two countries 
became extremely frosty in the late years Bush presidency. The election of Barack Obama as a 
new US President heralded also new approach in the US foreign policy towards global aﬀ airs. For 
Russo-American relations that meant a “reset” in an attempt to sooth the diﬀ erences between 
two countries and to fi nd common ground on a series of global and regional strategic issues. 
However, it is not yet clear whether countries view this “reset” as a means to achieve the mutually 
shared goals. At least in East and South-East European context the relations between Russia and 
United States are as divergent as ever, while in current time setting Russia may well enjoy upper 
hand simply because US foreign policy priorities may lie elsewhere. In this sense lack of strong 
American reaction on the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, a staunch American ally in the 
region, has been quite revealing; while the President Obama’s decision to call oﬀ  deployment of 
the anti-missile defense systems in Poland and Czech Republic sent jitters throughout the region 
and prompted a group of regional leaders to write an open letter to American President warning 
of perils of appeasement towards increasingly assertive Russia. 
European Union: still too heterogeneous on foreign policy matters
Basic elements: The EU has lately become a key factor in Moldova’s political, economic and social 
development. There has been important institutional progress in cooperation with Moldova, such 
as the EU-Moldova Action Plan, Autonomous Trade Preferences, EU Border Assistance Mission, 
Eastern Partnership initiative, etc. In 2010 Moldova is to start negotiating new Association 
Agreement and Free Trade agreement with the EU. The EU policy approach to Moldova is 
incremental. While Moldova stated clearly its desire to join the EU in the future, the EU has been 
staunchly reluctant to oﬀ er such a perspective. Moreover, as much as integration aspirations are 
concerned, the EU appears to view Moldova in a “regional perspective” (as part of its Eastern 
Partnership initiative), unwilling either single out it from the western CIS countries or include it 
in the “Western Balkans” package as Romania proposed. At the same time, the EU seems to be 
ready to assume an increasing role in promoting Moldova’s democratization and modernization 
and to counter-balance via soft-power policy tools the Russian resurgence.
Current context: The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty is meant to make European foreign policy 
more coherent and thus make the Union a stronger geopolitical player. However, the Lisbon 
Treaty may also mean growing role of bigger states, such as France and Germany, in the process 
of policy and decision-making3. At the same time, the more specifi c matters are yet to be settled 
more straight-forwardly in practice. In a sense, in the forthcoming period the EU will be quite 
consumed with the internal adaptation process, with fewer resources available for pro-active 
policy in Eastern neighborhood countries. 
1 The recent attacks on the governmental buildings in Kabul are one more omen of a prolonged, if ever possible, mission of keeping this 
country pacifi ed under control;
2 See for instance, Sergei Karaganov et al., Reconfi guration, not just a Reset, June 2009;
3 Stratfor, “The Lisbon Treaty’s Geopolitical Context”, November 4, 2009;
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Furthermore, the EU has continuously remained split over the policy towards Russia, which has 
substantial stake in the post-Soviet countries on its western wedge. Important ‘old’ member 
countries, such as Germany, France and Italy, are especially interested in maintaining strong ties 
with and are extremely cautious not to upset Russia with extending European sphere of infl uence 
in what Russia perceives as its “backyard”. Lack of strong response to Russo-Georgian war in 
2008, eﬀ ective vetoing of NATO accession promise to Ukraine, failure to eﬀ ectively promote 
common energy policy, divergent responses to latest Russian security initiative are all signs of 
diverse perspectives that various EU members have towards relations with Russian Federation. It 
is all too probable that despite increasingly warm stance towards Moldova’s European aspirations 
the EU will remain rather cautious and wary of upsetting Russia too much.
Russia: becoming extremely assertive in its foreign policy 
Basic elements: Formally Russian Federation supports territorial integrity and independence of the 
Republic of Moldova, nonetheless, the Transnistrian confl ict and continuous presence of Russian 
troops and munitions there is a thorn in the relations between the two countries. Russian policy 
towards Moldova should be viewed chiefl y as an element of its regional strategy of restoring its 
sphere of infl uence in many former Soviet Union countries. The overarching objectives seems 
to be blocking further expansion of Western infl uence and, especially, of Western “security 
umbrella”. Given the developments in Ukraine, Russia appears to view the Western CIS frontier 
as a “symbolic” line where it is more or less ready to confront Western interests, using for 
this matter both carrots and sticks if needed. At the same time, it should be mentioned that 
Russian policy towards fSU countries often lacks perspective (relying mostly on cooperation with 
incumbent, apparently loyal, regimes) and individualized approach to every particular country, 
mostly employing ‘one size fi ts all’ approach.
Current context: Vladimir Putin’s ascension to power was accompanied not only by consolidation 
of central government’s grip on power within Russia, but also with increasingly assertive foreign 
policy abroad. The “near abroad” has become one of the main venues of action for Russian foreign 
policy since former metropolis perceives these countries as its legitimate sphere of infl uence while 
Western infl uence as menace to its strategic interests; recovering and preserving infl uence in key 
countries such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus has become dictum in Russian foreign policy 
and a matter of survival for Russia and re-establishment of its geopolitical prowess. The Vladimir 
Putin’s remark that Russia would either rejoin the world’s leading nations or disappear1 should 
be also viewed through the perspective of its neighborhood. The control over its neighborhood 
is critical for Russia’s security and, concomitantly, it is a message to other actors: “I am back”. 
This ascendance was further facilitated by the rocketing fuel prices, fading US involvement in 
the region, lack of unanimity within the EU on its relationship with Russia, as well as internal 
weaknesses in the fSU countries.  
This is not to say, that Russia’s counter-oﬀ ensive has gone without blunders, such as open 
support for Viktor Yanukovich in 2004 elections in Ukraine, last gas war with Ukraine in 2009 
that apparently awoke EU on the matters of energy security, or support provided for Vladimir 
Voronin in the late Moldova’s general elections of April 2009. Nonetheless, at least in Ukraine 
and Moldova, Russia deftly managed to partly tilt the situation in its favor after all. In fact, as 
it was mentioned Russia lacks a coherent vision-dream for its former satellites, nonetheless it 
often aptly employs various tools, both carrots and sticks, in order to either bring to its heel, 
infl uence or destabilize its smaller and weaker neighbors. In the next year, Russia’s infl uence in its 
neighborhood may well be poised to grow. The launch of the Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus customs 
union will help Russia to project its economic interests, despite all the shenanigans surrounding 
1 Cited from ECFR, What does Russia think?, September, 2009;
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its ever closer integration with Belarus, while change of political leadership in Ukraine may usher 
in a period of relative political dominance of Russia on the Western wedges of the CIS.
Ukraine: weakened by political and economic frailties
Basic elements: On one hand, both Moldova and Ukraine are part of the same European package 
and this background often served as a favorable context for successful joint initiatives, such 
as EUBAM. On other hand time the relations between two countries were marred by several 
economic and border disputes (some of them appear to be settling now) as well as Transnistrian 
confl ict. The Ukrainian policy towards the latter issue often appeared to be infl uenced by diﬀ erent 
domestic political and business factions. At the same time, prior to the creation of Moldovan SSR 
in 1940 Transnistria was part of Ukrainian SSR and it appeared nurturing some “territorial hopes” 
in some political quarters in Ukraine. At the end of the day, Ukrainian policy towards Moldova is 
not clear-cut and seems to depend a lot on the fl uid regional context. 
Current context: The Orange revolution, although helpful for political rejuvenation, failed to deliver 
on its promises of sustainable economic modernization and European integration; its child – the 
Orange coalition – fell apart in acrimonious fashion leaving Ukrainian people disenchanted. The 
Western support for Ukraine has also faded away to certain extent. Whatever the outcome of the 
January elections, i.e. we witness either Viktor Yanukovich’s comeback or Yulia Timoshenko’s rise 
to power, the bet is a Ukraine less eager to upset Russian interests. Ukraine will not transform into a 
Russian satellite or ally; in fact, it may well maintain its European integration stance. Nevertheless, 
it will pursue pragmatic relationship with Russia and, thus, close cooperation in areas of strategic 
interest for both countries. Most likely, it will abandon its pursuit of NATO membership and will 
avoid displeasing Russia with unnecessary dramatic gestures characteristic for Yushchenko era. 
At the same time, Russian business interests will fi nd Ukraine a more friendly terrain since now 
on. Overall, the Russian infl uence in the region as a whole will be strengthened. 
Although, it should not dramatically infl uence the state of relations between Moldova and Ukraine 
for now, Moldovan leadership should be ready for a more reticent Ukrainian stance on some 
contentious issues, such as Transnistria. At the same time, these shifts will not abort continuous 
deterioration of relations between Romania and Ukraine. All this, will make regional politics more 
‘Balkanesque’.  
Romania: transforming in Moldova’s advocate in EU eyes 
Basic elements: The Romanian policy towards Moldova is determined by two key factors: (a) its 
position as a key element of Atlantist political infl uence and security architecture in South-East 
Europe; (b) historical ties with right-bank part of the Republic of Moldova, which in some quarters 
of Romanian political elite are either openly or discreetly nurturing “reunifi cation” dream. In this 
sense, fundamental objective of Romanian foreign policy is to support European aspirations of 
Moldova, keep Moldova fi rmly anchored in its Western drift and stave oﬀ  as much as possible 
Russian infl uence in Moldova. At the same time, Romania is keen to emphasize the “one nation, 
two states” formula, the “specialty” of Moldova-Romania relations and to keep “reunifi cation” 
perspective alive. Romania’s refusal to sign basic treaty and border treaty with Moldova only 
makes some quarters of political elites in Moldova suspect that “reunifi cation” dream is the core 
factor behind Romania’s geopolitical agenda towards Moldova.
Current context: The “regime change” in Moldova followed by Traian Basescu’s victory in the 
presidential elections in Romania is generally favorable for consolidation of the Moldova-Romania 
relations as well as for European aspirations of the Republic of Moldova. Both countries have 
been quick in showing the warming of bilateral relations. The visa regime imposed by Moldovan 
communist authorities in the wake of April 2009 unrest on the basis of alleged Romanian 
involvement in masterminding the street protests was swiftly lifted. The Agreement on small 
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cross-border traﬃ  c was signed and entered into force, while two new Romanian consulates were 
agreed to be opened in the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, beyond these niceties, Romanian 
President is a strongly pro-Atlantist leader, who is likely to carry an active pro-Moldova foreign 
policy aimed at putting Moldova fi rmly on European track, ideally as part of the “Western Balkans 
package”1. However, the question mark hangs over the ability of Romanian leadership to deliver 
on its energetic declarations.
Besides these evolutions, the global fi nancial crisis coupled with slow but steady rising as 
geopolitical star of Asia, has to certain extent shifted focus of the main geopolitical actors as 
well as limited resources available for pursuing foreign policy goals in the region. However, by 
the same token, it made many small countries much more vulnerable to infl uence and bullying 
from abroad. This is specifi cally true of countries from the CIS, but also the Balkans. Therefore, 
the stronger actors able to mobilize limited resources can use them in accomplishing geopolitical 
goals in the region. Both West and Russia were prompt to oﬀ er such resources, however, as 
crisis’ eﬀ ects are still unfolding the story is far from end.  
Navigating the geopolitical waters…
Although since the mid-2000 Moldova oﬃ  cially declared European integration to be its ultimate 
foreign policy goal, the road to reach it was bumpy2. The social uproar ensued in the aftermath 
of the allegedly rigged general elections of April 5, 2009, the political crisis and impasse at the 
background of quasi-civil confl ict that divided Moldova’s population in roughly two halves served 
as both rude awakening for the foreign observers that not all is fi ne in apparently democratizing 
and EU-bound Moldova and as a shock reminder for some quarters of Moldovan political elite and 
population of how shaky are the foundations on which the country’s edifi ce is built. 
The repeat elections held on July, 2009, brought to power anti-communist opposition parties 
which formed, albeit in a protracted manner, the Alliance for European Integration (AEI). As 
election of the president failed again, the time will surely test the cohesiveness of the AEI and 
resoluteness of its leaders, including on foreign policy matters. Quite naturally, the AIE is a 
heterogeneous entity; and this heterogeneity stretches out to foreign policy matters as well3. 
In the aftermath of the elections that saw governing Party of Communists ousted from power, 
widespread expectations were of fast progress in relations with the EU and Romania and growing 
strains in relations with Russian Federation. These assumptions have so far only partly passed 
the reality check. In fact, the picture appears to be a bit more complex than expected in some 
quarters. 
Certainly, the Alliance moved swiftly to consolidate relations with the EU and Romania, in particular. 
The pro-European aspirations were reiterated while integrationist message re-enforced. However, 
the pro-NATO rhetoric was dropped and the pledge to abandon the CIS, shared by some members 
of Alliance, was mooted. Furthermore, Moldovan authorities have been painstakingly cautious 
to establish pragmatic ties with Russia (progress with wine exports is an eloquent instance of 
such pragmatism) and maintain strategic dialogue with Russian authorities, and this is despite 
almost wholesale Russia’s support for Moldovan then-ruling Party of Communists throughout 
both electoral campaigns of 2009. 
Such a down-to-earth approach may illustrate both heightened vulnerabilities of Moldova as 
well as understanding of core geopolitical constraints infl uencing Moldova’s foreign policy. The 
1 See for instance, http://www.rfi .ro/stiri/politica/Republica-Moldova-subiect-de-discutie-intre-Basescu-si-Rompuy.html;
2 See for instance, Euromonitors no.1-17 published by Adept and Expert-Grup, available at www.expert-grup.org and www.e-democracy.
md;
3 It also refl ects to certain extent the diﬀ erent foreign policy options of the AIE’s electoral constituencies;
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least thing Moldova needs now is the external shocks resulting from diplomatic blunders. This is 
not to mean that Moldovan authorities should adopt policy of foreign appeasement and neglect 
of national interests. Rather, this policy should be a pragmatic one of pursuing current national 
overarching objective of European integration/approximation, while taking into account existing 
constraints and refraining from dramas of sudden geopolitical turnarounds. Such a no-nonsense 
approach should be also refl ected in domestic politics and result in a more cohesive Moldovan 
society.  
The other option available, in fact preferable for some parts of governing Alliance, is forceful 
drive towards Euro-Atlantic integration aiming at both integration into the EU and NATO coupled 
with manifest anti-Russian actions and declarations accompanied as well by measures that may 
be perceived as infringing upon rights of Russian-speaking minorities. Such approach, however, 
may risk destabilization of both Alliance and the whole political situation in the country; while 
electoral backlash in the forthcoming elections may bury the Alliance altogether. 
All in all, the Alliance is a dynamic and “growing” organism, thus, we can witness features of both 
approaches as parts of the Alliance strive for common denominator. Not less important, some 
foreign players may also be in the process of designing and articulating policy and approaches 
to dialog with new Moldovan leadership. This may sometimes lead to puzzling fl uctuations and 
hiccups in Moldovan foreign policy, however, in longer term the understanding of and adaptation 
to the constraints and contexts outlined in this analysis will help it settling on a steadier path.
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5. Moldova: global challenges for the XXI century
This chapter chiefl y focuses on the risks that are not of Moldova’s making. However, these risks may 
well have signifi cant eﬀ ects over Moldova’s present and future. Although Moldovan authorities and 
society can do little in order to avert or mitigate these risks they certainly should pay attention to 
them and enhance the capability to adapt to them. Sound adaptation strategies can either minimize 
the adverse eﬀ ects or even help Moldova capitalize on eventual benefi ts. In this chapter we outline 
four major global risks for Moldova likely to aﬀ ect the country’s development in near and more 
distant future: global economic crisi(e)s, climate change, scarcer and dearer food, and eventual 
global energy run-out.
Shifting economic landscapes…
The second half of 2008 was marked by a global fi nancial and economic turmoil of scale not seen 
since the World War II (see Table 11). For the fi rst time since 1945 the global output shrank. While 
the end of 2009 showed fi rst timid signs of recovery, the future of world economy is far from 
certain. Will we witness a strong economic rebound or “double-dip” recession1? Or the global 
economy will settle for a ‘new normal’ based on sluggish investment and anemic labor markets?2 
Table 11 Output by main geographical areas, % change on previous year, 2007-2009
Area/Country 2007 2008 2009∗
World 5.2 3.0 -1.1
US 2.1 0.4 -2.7
Euro 2/7 0.7 -4.2
Emerging Europe (CEE, Baltics, SEE) 6.0 4.1 –4.3
CIS 8.6 5.5 –6.7
Moldova 3.0 7.2 -7.0
Note: * - estimate
Source: IMF database.
Furthermore, at the background of the global economic crisis we can see some tectonic 
geopolitical shifts underway3. The developed, G-7, countries have seen their role diminishing in 
recent years, while the position of the BRIC4 and other developing countries has been considerably 
entrenched. The search for global solutions to the economic crisis puts a signifi cant emphasis 
on the importance of these countries, and especially that of China. Any new global architecture 
1 Nobel prize-winning economists Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman as well as Nouriel Roubini are, to name just a few, among those 
reputable economists who expect American economy to stumble again in 2010;
2 See for instance IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2009; The Economist, “The long climb – A special report on the world economy”, 
October 2009; 
3 See for instance Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008, Foreign Aﬀ airs, January-February 2009;
4 BRIC group of countries includes: Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
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based on “Bretton Woods”-type institutional arrangement should and, perhaps, will have at its 
core the new representation system that would more or less satisfy legitimate interests of these 
countries1. The G20 agreements appear to be just a fi rst step in this direction2.
The last but not the least, these geopolitical shifts are well-illustrated by two open questions. 
Firstly, as the Anglo-Saxon economic model took thrashing in the wake of the crisis, the majority 
of national governments of Western and Eastern world alike rushed to oﬀ er economy and 
industry-wide stimulus packages, not to mention colossal bail-outs in the fi nancial sector. Has it 
been just a short-term measure required to avoid the Japan-style recession or an advent of the 
drift towards state capitalism? Secondly, the dollar has shed some luster as the world’s main 
reserve currency. Moreover, America in order to heal it some most critical imbalances would 
rather see the greenback gradually devalued. What currency should be then at the core of a new 
global fi nancial system?
Most important, as global leaders are still in the search for most optimal solution and many 
imbalances and vices at the root of the current turmoil persist, the world economy may well enter 
the period of reoccurring fi nancial and economic crises of varying degrees.
The evolving international context leaves more open questions than answers for Moldova’s 
future. The crisis impact was swiftly felt in Moldova, although its eﬀ ects are yet to be fully shown. 
Just a couple of numbers to assess the magnitude of the impact: the GDP is estimated to contract 
by around 7% in 2009, the fi xed investment plunged by almost 45%, while exports and imports are 
set to shrink by 20-30% magnitude, and budget defi cit to reach 9% of GDP3. 
While the roots of the crisis are obviously out of the reach of the Moldovan authorities they are to 
fi nd the ways to grapple with its consequences. The constraints, however, abound. As a small and 
open economy Moldova found itself at the receiving end as the crisis unfolded. Due to the tough 
fi nancial constraints, magnifi ed by the protracted political hiatus, Moldovan authorities have not 
been able to resort to stimulus packages employed by wealthier countries. Moreover, the IMF 
lending will certainly provide a short-time respite for the Moldovan economy, but will it suﬃ  ce 
to ensure a necessary upward shift needed to shrug oﬀ  the lasting consequences of the crisis? 
Or will the eventual implementation of the Economic Stabilization and Revival Program suﬃ  ce to 
ensure economic resilience in the face of reoccurring crises?
Perhaps, in order to weather better the eﬀ ects of the current crisis as well as to be ready to 
rebound faster if any new crisis occurs Moldova should aim at accomplishing a triad solution.
Firstly, Moldovan authorities need a new development paradigm that would seek diversifying 
sources of economic growth. The excessive reliance either on remittances fueling internal 
consumption or eventual export-led growth can only magnify the impact of global or regional 
downturn. Moldovan economy cannot thrive and modernize within the patterns of the remittance-
based growth seen in the recent years. An innovative approach, in the shape of industrial policy4 
aimed at increasing competitiveness of the good producers and services providers including with 
the aim to jump-start the export growth might be appropriate. 
Secondly, besides diversifi ed growth, Moldovan authorities should think on creation of a ‘crisis 
fund’ whose means could be used in order to cushion the fi rst eﬀ ects of an eventual crisis. Of 
course, this fund cannot be of a scale to shed the need of international aid for the crisis time, 
however, it may help the government to stave oﬀ  some short-term adverse impacts.`
1 See George Soros “A New World Architecture” and Joseph Stiglitz “A Global Crisis requires Global Solutions”, both at Project Syndicate, 
2009;
2 For a brief overview of the most essential points see: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/02/g20-agreements-at-a-glance;
3 For a detailed account of the global fi nancial crisis impact on Moldovan economy see Expert-Grup, “MEGA: biannual economic review”, 
2009 fall edition;
4 As advocated, for instance, by Dani Rodrik in “Growth After The Crisis”, May 2009; 
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Thirdly, in order to fi nance all these niceties Moldova needs funds. In order to attract these funds 
from international sources, Moldovan authorities should present a clear vision, with explicit 
benchmarks and monitoring tools in order to ensure that donors’ money is employed for good 
use. At the international level, Moldova should plead for more anti-crisis aid from the developed 
countries, as envisaged by the G-20 London agreements.
The Future’s warm embrace…
The Climate Change appears to be one of the most daunting challenges facing humankind in 
the XXI century. Indeed, it is truly global as no country is able to escape its warm embrace. 
However global it is, many poor countries will fi nd themselves more vulnerable as they are 
usually located in the more aﬀ ected southern areas and are lacking fi nancial resources required 
to pursue mitigation and adaptation policies. Moreover, as many of the developing countries 
have embarked on the modernization catch-up path, their pro-growth strategies imply more 
GHGs emissions. In fact, past emissions meaning that the planet is “committed” to Climate 
Change are accounted for developed world, while more than half of current emissions “belong” 
to developing countries. Therefore, there is need for a sound trade-oﬀ  that would ensure 
economic growth for developing countries combined with the sustainable and comprehensive 
cuts in GHGs emissions. 
Nonetheless, in order to bring to fruition such a balanced approach for economic development 
the globe needs at least three things: political agreement, fi nancial funds and green technologies. 
On all of the accounts global eﬀ orts are patchy. The COP15 infamously fi nished with a vague 
and non-binding statement of principles agreed with China, India, Brazil and South Africa1. The 
developed countries are also very far from agreement on how much funds they are ready to 
devote in order to support mitigation eﬀ orts in the developing countries. At the same time, 
the green technologies critical for “post-carbon” global economy are either unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive in a way to derail global economic growth2. 
The situation with no global political agreement, no suﬃ  cient funds to support mitigation and 
adaptation eﬀ orts coupled with lack of aﬀ ordable green technologies underlines the vulnerability 
of the planet as a whole. However, poor and small countries are the most vulnerable in this 
respect. They are short of money needed to adapt to the eﬀ ects of climate change, while fi nding 
themselves at the receiving end of the climate change adverse eﬀ ects without contributing to it 
to any considerable extent.
Unfortunately, Moldova can fi nd itself exactly among these countries. Although climate change 
eﬀ ects in Moldova will not be as dramatic as in more vulnerable southern and sea-shore countries, 
they still cannot be ignored (Table 12). In the case of both emission scenarios shown in the table 
increase in annual air temperatures in Moldova can reach on average 4.1-5.4°C. At the same time, 
a decrease in precipitations is expected, with summers especially becoming drier. The intensity 
and frequency of extreme weather events, such as droughts, fl oods, hails, etc. is also expected 
to rise. All this will have a considerable impact on the most vital natural resources, such as water, 
ecosystems, land, as well as adverse eﬀ ects on human health3. Besides that, climate change and 
need to adapt to its eﬀ ects may partly or completely transform the ways Moldova sees its future 
development.
1 Perhaps, this in a way also refl ects new geopolitical realities as well as diminishing foreign policy clout of the EU on a global stage;
2 See for instance, Bjørn Lomborg, Global Warming’s Technology Defi cit, Project Syndicate, 2009;
3 NHDR, 2009,
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Table 12 Ensemble-averaged projections of seasonal air temperatures 
and precipitation relative changes (%) in comparison with baseline climate 
Season Emission scenario
Mean air temperature Precipitation sum
Time horizons
2010-2039 2040-2069 2070-2099 2010-2039 2040-2069 2070-2099
Winter
SRES А2 1.9 4.0 5.7 7.5 11.4 10.4
SRES В2 2.2 3.5 4.4 8.5 13.6 15.5
Spring
SRES А2 13.2 26.8 43.2 4.4 6.0 5.5
SRES В2 18.6 25.3 32.7 6.4 12.3 11.6
Summer
SRES А2 9.3 19.7 32.9 -7.8 -19.3 -30.2
SRES В2 11.8 18.3 23.8 -13.2 -16.7 -22.6
Autumn
SRES А2 17.8 34.3 55.4 -6.07 -16.0 -17.6
SRES В2 19.3 34.0 42.3 -6.2 -6.1 -6.8
Note: Winter changes in temperatures are given in absolute values (°C) 
Source: National Human Development Report 2009/2010, Climate Change in Moldova: Socio-Economic Impact 
and Policy Options for Adaptation, UNDP Moldova.
There are series of steps Moldova should take in order to adapt to these transformations and to 
not allow derailing of its development plans; some of them are costly, some not. However, many 
of the actions to be undertaken are welcome regardless climate change eﬀ ects. These are quite 
simple and necessary steps.
One of them is eﬃ  cient use of the available resources. This refers to both local and imported 
resources. For instance, rational land use coupled with implementation of modern technologies 
and adapted crops could oﬀ set to signifi cant extent eventual losses in agriculture in the aftermath 
of the climate change eﬀ ects. However, regardless these eﬀ ects, these actions would enhance 
productivity, competitiveness and sustainability of Moldovan agriculture, as well as country’s 
food security overall.
Another good instance is energy eﬃ  ciency. Enhancement of the energy eﬃ  ciency of the buildings 
and equipment would require signifi cant investments. However, rationalizing use of energy 
through demand management and changing consumer behavior may come rather cheap. 
The next action should emphasize investment in infrastructure: transport, power distribution 
and water provision. All of these are critical for economic development in any circumstances. 
Nonetheless, well-timed investment in roads, grids and water-pipes will help Moldovan economy 
and people adapting easier to the changes ushered by warming planet without jeopardizing 
development prospects of the country. 
One more important venue of action should approach the participation in the international and 
regional adaptation eﬀ orts. Given the fact that the EU’s role is set to grow in Moldova it would be 
wise to follow the European lead in this area and rely on its help in adaptation eﬀ orts including 
through broader adoption of the green innovative technologies and practices.
Food for the masses
After several decades of cheap, the new century heralded the rude awakening on that matter 
(see Chart 19). The prices increased almost two-fold only to recede slightly in the wake of the 
fi nancial crisis of 2008. However, starting fi rst months of 2009 they have been climbing back. This 
ominous “reload” of dear food should not come as surprise since all the fundamental underlying 
reasons are still there: the world’s population is growing and so is demand for food. Moreover, the 
population of the globe is expected to reach 9 billion people by 2050 – who will feed the masses?
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Moreover, world’s populations have not only been growing, it has also been getting richer as 
such populous countries as China and India have started pulling themselves out of poverty. More 
aﬄ  uent people consume foodstuﬀ s with bigger protein intake, such as meat and dairy products, 
production of which requires much more considerable input of feed grains, etc. Although the 
global fi nancial crisis has dented this drive for prosperity, the trend will not go away. Furthermore, 
if during the crisis’ apex most recession-hit industries in the developed countries operated at 60-
70% of capacity, agriculture was at full capacity, last year’s cereals crop was the largest on record 
and there was little fallow land ready to be taken under the plough1.
The oil world-wide has been getting more expensive and has contributed to more expensive food, 
as it is used both as fuel per se as well as input for producing fertilizers, etc. Moreover, the “bio-
fuel frenzy” led to new signifi cant pressures on agriculture as increasing amount of agricultural 
land was put to produce bio-crops, such as maize.
Decade-long neglect of investment in agriculture (especially in poor countries) resulted in lower 
yield growth in developed (from 3-6% last decade to 1-2% nowadays) and fl at yield growth in 
developing countries.
Besides these fundamental factors, the speculative binge on commodity markets coupled 
with depreciation of the US dollar also supported rise in food prices. Little wonder, recent FAO 
conference on food security concluded that a new surge in prices like the one seen in 2007-08 is 
a “realistic possibility”2. 
Chart 19 Evolution of Food Price Index and Price Indexes for selected products, 2002-2009 
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Source: FAO.
For Moldova a more expensive food is not necessarily bad thing. Moldovan farmers can benefi t 
from this spike. Nonetheless, the equation is not as simple as: more expensive food = more income 
for farmers. Such thinking is undercut by more expensive fertilizers and fuel, by soil degradation, 
convoluted market structure, etc. Thus, in order to benefi t from the rising food prices policy 
action should aim at improving two fundamental variables: production and market access. 
1 The Economist, “Feeding the world”, November 2009;
2 See “Food prices to stay high, volatile: FAO”, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59B2NK20091012,
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In order to boost agricultural production a blend of steps should be taken. 
First and foremost, more eﬃ  cient land use practices should be employed. The transformation 
of Moldovan agriculture is far from complete and signifi cant part of arable land is worked by 
small peasant farms that often lack resources for eﬃ  cient land use. Even on the bigger plots 
farmers often neglect scientifi c norms and innovations that aim at preserving land’s fertility. 
Continuous land degradation will undoubtedly imperil any advancement in growing agricultural 
productivity. 
Secondly, stronger attention should be paid to enhancing the agricultural inputs. The instances 
might include but not be limited to drought-tolerant and pest-resistant crop varieties, disease-
resistant livestock, and high-yield agricultural production systems that use less water and capture 
nitrogen from the air, etc. Such steps would also help Moldovan farmers withstand the threats 
posed by the climate change that can jeopardize future of Moldovan agriculture altogether1. 
Thirdly, the market structure in Moldova should be reassessed from the standpoint of more fair 
distribution of profi ts as the result of agricultural activity. A sprawling network of intermediaries on 
Moldovan market of agricultural goods is a growing concern and disincentive for investment and 
modernization of Moldovan agricultural activity both by investors and farmers. It also precludes 
genuine competition on the market that would benefi t producers and consumers alike. 
Imperpetuum mobile
The last decade was marked by price spikes in many commodities, but no one was more salient 
and disturbing than that of oil and other energy resources (Chart 20). The energy is vital for the 
global economic development and human prosperity and thus these sharp price rises swiftly 
exposed vulnerabilities of current road to prosperity. 
Chart 20 Oil and natural gas prices, 2007-2009, 
USD per barrel and per thousands of cubic meters, respectively
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1  NHDR, 2009;
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The underlying cause is certainly the rising global demand for black gold (see Table 13) driven by 
insatiable drive for economic growth. Since 1995 up to 2007 the global demand for oil increased by 
more than 22%1, mostly due to fuel-hungry and briskly expanding Asian economies. For instance, 
Chinese demand in that period more than doubled. Furthermore, the frenzy on the commodity 
market driven by the hedge funds magnifi ed the rise in prices to unfathomable proportions.
Table 13 Oil demand and production by groups of countries, million barrels per day, 2007-2009
2007 2008 2009
Demand
OECD 25.5 47.6 45.4
Non-OECD 36.9 38.7 39.1
Production 
OPEC 35.5 35.9
Non-OPEC 50.1 50.6 51.0
Source: IMF.
But besides the demand-side factors, the supply-side developments also played their role. Oil and 
gas reserved are exhaustible after all and there is ongoing debate that the oil production may have 
already reached its peak. For instance, from 1960-1985 to 1990-2006 the ratio between discoveries 
of new oil and oil production went upside down: in the fi rst period the world discovered as twice 
as much oil as it produced, in the following period the ratio was literally opposite2. The jury is still 
out whether this development happened because of low investment determined by low oil prices 
in the 1990’s or the fact that global oil production has already reached its peak3. However, even 
if the peak has not been reached yet, it is close. In its most recent estimates usually sanguine 
International Energy Agency purports that the conventional oil production will reach its peak by 
2020, while demand is expected to grow until 2030. 
At the same time, the oil production in some countries did not live up to expectations. Oil 
production in Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela was lower in 2008 (10.2 mln. barrels per day) than 
in 1998 (12.7 mln. barrels per day) due to diﬀ erent reasons ranging from civil strife to neglect of 
investment. In fact, back in 1998 it was expected to reach by 2008 a production level of 18.4 mln. 
barrels per day4.
There are further two supply-side constraints.
The fi rst one is climate change. On the one hand, the world will, sooner or later, reach a binding 
agreement on cutting CO2 emissions. Such an agreement, although may dent somewhat the 
demand for oil, will also make non-conventional oil resources less feasible as their extraction 
requires much more energy to extract and thus might lead to more CO2 emissions and air pollution. 
At the same time, the level of productivity of various renewable sources of energy is far from 
required in order to ensure success in continuous quest for economic growth and prosperity.
The second constraint is the fact that oil and other energy resources, such as natural gas, have 
become increasingly politicized. For instance, the overwhelming share of oil and gas production 
is currently in the states’ hands. This basically means that the revenues are used for the domestic 
and foreign politics ends even at the cost of lower investment in production and exploration, 
1 Hereinafter, the data of International Energy Agency is used;
2 The Economist, “2020 Vision”, December 2009;
3 See more on “oil peak” debate in Special Report “OIL: The Long Goodbye” in Foreign Policy, September-October, 2009 as well as Has Oil 
Production Peaked, Bassam Fattouh, Project Syndicate, 2009. 
4 Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008, Foreign Aﬀ airs, January-February 2009;
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while energy supply is sometimes seen as the most feasible tool to achieve geopolitical goals 
by some producing countries. By the same token, consuming countries often employ diﬀ erent 
instruments in order to ensure their access to these strategic resources. 
Some countries can boast “geological endowments”, while others ability to project its geopolitical 
power (or both) in order to ensure access to oil. There is also a third group of countries with 
neither geology blessing nor geopolitical clout or other resources ensure stable access to energy 
resources … and Moldova is lucky enough to fi nd itself in this latter group of countries. 
The predicament faced by Moldova is further complicated by some concerns over the reliability of 
supply, i.e. Moldova has to import over 90% of energy resource in order to satisfy its needs, while 
sometimes the supply of natural gas is jeopardized due to the Russo-Ukrainian tussle over the 
gas price issues1. In this sense any energy security strategy should pursue a two-prong strategy: 
to limit external vulnerabilities by scaling up local power production2 and changing mix of the 
energy used in economy; and by striving for diversifi cation of supply, especially of natural gas.
Certain shedding of dependency on the imported energy resources can be attained through 
the combination of measures. First of all, local production capacity should be developed. Given 
Moldova’s natural endowment such a progress can be achieved only in small-scale hydro-power 
generation and renewable energy resources3 (of which biomass has the biggest potential, but also 
solar and wind energy) development both for power and thermal power generation. Secondly, 
more attention should be paid to energy eﬃ  ciency and conservation with the aim at modernizing 
equipment and production process (both in energy production and in non-energy sector) and 
buildings; as well as improvement of transport infrastructure with the view of cutting losses. Tariﬀ  
policy favoring energy-savers, i.e. consume less – pay less per unit consumed, may also be helpful. 
Thirdly, the balance of energy used should be tilted towards more power consumption and less 
natural gas consumption. This will also reduce the vulnerabilities caused by limited reliability of 
natural gas supply. 
Finally, diversifi cation of gas supply will remain a contentious issue. Although accession to the 
Energy Community Treaty accompanied by signifi cant internal market liberalization will help 
diversifying access to power supply on a competitive basis, the diversifi cation of gas supply 
will remain a distant prospect so far as Moldova remains tied up to the Gazprom gas supply. 
Participation in the prospective new gas routes is attractive, but would be costly while these 
routes have remained so far mostly on paper. The reverse connection with Romanian gas transit 
network looks much more attainable and cheap at the moment both as a back-up option in the 
case of a sudden disruption of supply and as a longer-term option for diversifi cation of supply.
1 Moldova not only imports natural gas from one source (Russia), it also comes via one transit country (Ukraine) leading to double “ge-
ography” curse;
2 The Cuciurgan power plant situated in break-away Transnistria region and privatized by Russian company RAO EES has the needed 
capacities to cover Moldova’s power needs as well as to produce power for export. Although currently Moldova buys power from this 
power plant via unclear price scheme it has no sway over the activity of the plant. At the same time legitimacy of privatization of the 
plant is questioned by many policy-makers of the right-bank Moldova;
3 For more information see Government of the Republic of Moldova, National Program for Renewable Energy Resources Development 
2003-2010;
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6. Policy implications and recommendations
In this concluding section we fi rstly try to convey the readers some key messages that we believe 
should infl uence the policy agenda of the current and future governments in Moldova. Then we 
enlist a series of key challenges, risks and opportunities that already do or are likely to infl uence 
development of Moldova as a state and put forward some policy options to address them.
Key conclusions from the analysis
Unfortunately, Moldova has not been blessed with either signifi cant reserves of natural resources 
or productive capital. Land is the only abundant resource but it has not been valued economically 
so far and is subject to man-made erosive process threatening its productive and regenerative 
capacity. At the same time, there is too much land in Moldova allotted under ineﬃ  cient agricultural 
activities and too little for industrial purposes, including for the infrastructure necessary for the 
agricultural sector growth. Short of natural resources and capital, Moldova has to put in place 
more clever development strategies relying mostly on better-trained human capital and skillful 
absorption/development and use of technologies, including those that are energy-, water- and 
land-eﬃ  cient. Lack of own energy resources and growing defi cit of water resources will remain 
in the future among the most fundamental constraints limiting not only the country’s economic 
development but also its geopolitical options. As human resources represent the most available 
resource for Moldova to use for its economic development, increasing the labor productivity 
through better education, innovation and technological development/transfer should be a 
paramount objective on the agenda of any government that care about Moldova.
Against most of the transition countries, Moldova has made very modest economic progress after 
becoming independent in 1991. As a net assessment, Moldova was not able to make use of its natural 
endowment and human resources and to overcome its geographic and structural weaknesses and 
thus to achieve higher living standards for its population. Massive labor migration is the best 
litmus test for this failure. Inconsistent and incoherent economic development policy has been 
one of the key factors behind Moldovan economic drawbacks. The Moldovan governments were 
not able to get rid of Soviet-type practices of interfering in private business; on contrary, after 
2001 the situation worsened even more, as the power vertical penetrated not only the public 
administration but also the private sector. Moldova was not successful enough in dismantling 
its system of erratic business regulation and to attract and retain foreign (as well as domestic) 
investments. No surprise, the economic growth achieved between 2000 and 2008 ended when 
its main engine – migrants’ remittances – contracted. Financial markets are still feeble and unable 
to provide the much necessary investments at a reasonable cost. With its exports growing rather 
slow and imports mostly concentrated in non-substitutable items, the country has also suﬀ ered 
of a rapidly worsening terms of trade. A key conclusion is that the true economic modernization 
of the country is yet to be achieved and unfortunately, if it proceeds at recent speed, this task will 
span over many electoral cycles if not decades.
Moldovan society is quite heterogeneous and divided. Obviously, there is no easy fi x to the latest 
predicament. However, it would be sensible to follow the path that would not make these dividing 
P o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s 
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gaps deeper. This would not require any extraordinary eﬀ orts; rather it would mean avoiding 
actions that would alienate and disfavor any ethnical, religious, etc, social groups; it would also 
ask authorities to refrain from forcing “identity solutions” on social groups opposing it. 
By the same token, the constitutional reform should be approached with care. In short term, 
the only constitutional provision that appears to be in need of amendment is the one on the 
election of Moldova’s president. This protracted stalemate seems to be a real block in further 
country’s development and its dismantlement is in the common interest of Moldovan people 
and all political parties. Thus, its modifi cation is the least common denominator for the leading 
political parties in Moldova. 
On the external front the key message is to fi ll the pro-European policy course with practical 
meaning: the words should be matched by deeds. In other words, all external and especially “pro-
European” commitments should not be left on paper, but mirrored by deep and comprehensive 
domestic reforms. At the same time, open and cooperative relations with other regional actors 
should be promoted, while unnecessary and provocative statements or actions (projected either 
outwards or for domestic political use) should be avoided. The European integration process 
should not be dramatically eﬀ ervescent, but rather a calm and dull process.
Moldova’s development framework assessment and policy options
Development threat/challenge/risk/
opportunity Policy options / strategy
Due to its geographic location and poor 
transport infrastructure, Moldova is 
economically remote and unattractive 
as transit route. At the same time, as 
shown by the Giurgiulesti case, private 
developers possessing state-of-art 
management and industrial know-how 
can successfully develop a Moldova-
based international logistics services 
sector. 
• Streamline and get more transparent the customs procedure, including 
through wider use of electronic technologies, with the purpose of 
speeding up the customs traﬃ  c;
• Keep on attracting EU funds and make better use of own resources for 
restoring/building bridges connecting Moldova with Romania, Moldova 
with Ukraine and the Nistru river right-bank Moldova with the left-bank 
one;
• Conduct feasibility assessment of a wider set of technical solutions 
to speed up the traﬃ  c and increase the volume of rail-road cargoes 
between Moldova and Europe via Romania;
• Amend the Land Code to simplify the procedure of changing land 
destination (especially from agricultural to constructions) with the 
purpose of streamlining the creation of various types of industrial 
parks, including those providing international logistics services;
• Based on the Giurgiulesti example, continue attracting international 
companies to develop logistics services hubs in Chisinau, Cahul, Balti, 
Ungheni, and Marculesti;
Most of the Moldova’s citizens live in 
very small and quite disordered rural 
communities, suﬀ ering of poor or 
totally absent access to basic public 
services, including safe water, and 
faring a depressive social and cultural 
environment. Providing cost-eﬀ ective 
housing and transport infrastructure 
to these communities and developing a 
more socializing cultural environment 
remains a key challenge for the 
government. 
• Strengthen electric power grid across the country and promote electric 
power-based solutions for heating private houses and public buildings 
in rural communities as alternative to natural gas; investing more in 
electric-power grid (as well as generation) and developing international 
grid connections is also a more intelligent solution for the long-term 
perspective when natural gas will deplete or get too expensive;
• Promote in rural areas use of waste-to-energy technologies (including 
methane from biomasses, straw-fi red power and heating plants), wind 
and solar power generators, and energy conversion and insulation 
technologies;
• Promote use of non-pollutant, energy-eﬃ  cient sewage and water 
treatment systems based on ecological sanitation principles;
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Development threat/challenge/risk/
opportunity Policy options / strategy
• Promote cost-eﬀ ective and environment -friendly solutions for the 
livestock sector in Moldova, and encourage the livestock transfer 
outside the perimeter of the communities in the corporate sector;
• Use existing international funds to create appropriate waste disposal 
areas in each rural and urban communities and adopt more severe fi nes 
for improper waste treatment and disposal and eﬀ ectively enforce 
them;
Moldova has very limited natural 
resources, including basic ones such as 
energy and water. On the other hand, 
Moldova’s reserves of land and of some 
mineral resources are quite high, even 
though not properly used.
• Conduct comprehensive geologic audit and economic assessment of 
the country natural resources, including of the rare mineral resources 
and adopt a program for more eﬃ  cient mining/operating the existing 
reserves;
• Promote adaptation of existing and/or development of innovative 
energy-eﬃ  cient, water-eﬃ  cient and waste-free processing technologies 
as integral parts of economic processes and social life;
• Promote land rehabilitation technologies tailored to the needs and 
fi nancial resources of the small-scale farms;
• Enforce eﬀ ectively and universally the provisions of the Land Code 
regarding land protection measures;
• Make the land available for purchase for non-residents to increase 
investment in agriculture and spur income of the rural residents;
During the early transition period 
Moldova lost a sizeable part of its labor 
and human capital. With migration 
easily available, Moldova still continues 
losing it. Temptations to migrate will 
decline as domestic salaries grow; but 
in the foreseeable future migration is 
set to remain an integral part of the 
Moldova’s development model. 
• Moldovan state needs to ensure eﬀ ective protection of its citizens 
anywhere in the world through its diplomatic service and through 
promotion of adequate enforcement of international and bilateral 
agreements;
• Moldova needs to eﬀ ectively reform its education sector and get rid 
of corruption in order to render Moldovan diplomas internationally 
recognized and thus to provide more chances to its citizens to fi nd 
better jobs abroad; 
• Create an eﬃ  cient, independent and impartial Agency for academic 
accreditation of the all post-secondary educational institutions;
• Allow more fi nancial and administrative autonomy to universities, 
colleges and vocational schools, create Advisory Boards in each 
education institution as bodies entitled to overview the management 
practices and make educational institutions more publicly accountable;
• Encourage foreign universities and vocational schools to open 
subsidiaries in Moldova and engage in European education projects in 
order to signifi cantly contribute to the human capital development in 
Moldova;
• Adapt training curricula to market needs by establishing partnerships 
between education institutions and employers;
• Encourage university-based research, technology development and 
innovation process;
Poor productive capital is a key 
constraint undermining labor 
productivity. Moldova needs much more 
public, private and foreign investment 
in order to narrow its technological and 
productivity gap with other countries in 
the region.
• Adopt creation in Moldova of the most attractive regulatory 
environment in Central and Eastern Europe as political goal of the 
government and use experience of the front-running Singapore, 
Estonia, Hungary, Georgia in this regard;
• Specifi cally, streamline the change in land destination and issuance of 
the building permits procedures; 
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Development threat/challenge/risk/
opportunity Policy options / strategy
• With the same purpose, ensure better protection of the investors rights 
and enforce accountability of the executive directors in public and 
private joint stock companies;
• Support consolidation of the available land (either by local/regional 
public authorities or private developers) with the purpose of creating 
a national system of industrial parks in most urban communities 
in Moldova (classical industrial parks, agro-processing parks, eco-
industrial parks, logistics parks, etc.);
Not a long time ago, the Moldovan 
version of the economic policy meant an 
arbitrary and opaque practice enabling 
the government to eﬀ ectively control 
the business through the state control 
bodies, a vast and ineﬃ  cient public 
administration and a perverse system 
of pecuniary payments and imposed 
social responsibility. If not abated, this 
tradition will resurface and completely 
undermine the domestic private sector.
• Moldova needs more functional and independent market regulatory 
agencies in order to eﬀ ectively impose universal rights and obligations 
for all market players, including for the Government and for the state-
owned enterprises (Agency for Protection of Competition, Agency 
for Energy Regulation, Agency for Transport Regulation, Agency for 
Electronic Communications and Information Technologies, and others);
• It is necessary to create a public independent agency to eﬀ ectively 
protect the consumers rights;
• Sector-wise joint working groups have to be established by the 
government and the business as means of rebuilding mutual 
confi dence and adopting transparent policy decisions;
• Key to abolishing the system through which the government and 
state control bodies exert excessive interference in private business 
is a functional and independent justice system; enabling such a justice 
system should be among the priorities of any benevolent government 
in Moldova;
After the initial macroeconomic chaos in 
early transition period, achieving a more 
stable macroeconomic environment in 
Moldova was precluded by high public 
budgetary commitments (comparable 
to OECD average in relative terms) 
and lack of necessary institutional 
and structural measures to redress 
infl ationary pressures. 
• Moldovan government has to achieve the much necessary intra-
budgetary optimization of the expenditures in order to let the economy 
grow faster than the budget in long term; a strategic option in this 
regard would be to allow more private initiative, including through 
public-private partnerships, in the areas which so far have been 
traditionally seen as governmental sphere: maintenance, repair and 
construction of roads and rail-road, administration of free economic 
and industrial zones, maintenance of public parks, squares, etc. 
• Combating infl ation in long run requires, aside from traditional 
monetary policy tools, a more eﬃ  cient mix of structural and 
institutional measures to make markets competitive, prevent trust 
agreements and dramatically improve energy eﬃ  ciency across 
economic sectors and households.
Moldova has got a rather 
underdeveloped fi nancial system 
which is unable to amass domestic 
savings to transform them in long-term 
deposits and to fi nance investment. 
Presently, the commercial banks 
are in rather diﬃ  cult situation (even 
though less troubled than in all other 
countries in the region) because of the 
increasing share on non-performing 
loans concentrated in two sectors 
(constructions and winemaking) with 
potentially escalating risks. 
• Government, National Bank of Moldova, commercial banks and debtors 
have to discuss and adopt a mutually agreed plan of restructure of 
non-performing loans in order to prevent situation worsening with 
potentially more destabilizing eﬀ ects;
• Attract more strategic investment in the Moldovan banking sector 
while monitoring carefully the sector exposure to external and currency 
risks;
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Development threat/challenge/risk/
opportunity Policy options / strategy
Moldova has achieved a decent 
degree of geographic diversifi cation 
of its foreign trade and a high level 
of integration in the world economy. 
However, because of the worsening 
terms of trade and growing needs of a 
growing economy, Moldova’s foreign 
trade is utterly unbalanced.
• Moldova has to sell larger volume of more valuable exports in order 
to accumulate the currency necessary to cover its non-substitutable 
imports. Achieving this in short run is not possible and the country is 
set to run high trade defi cits in the near future. In long run, the exports 
capacities will grow as eﬀ ective economic output converges to its 
potential. The options presented above will contribute to this. More 
specifi c policy options follow:
• Ensure transparency and eﬀ ective enforcement of the quite simple 
customs procedures;
• Get rid of all anti-competitive import arrangements;
• Streamline the system of technical authorization and product quality 
and safety certifi cation;
• Adopt EU regulations in the veterinary and phytosanitary sectors;
Moldova’s society is highly 
heterogeneous and often divided along 
ethnical, religious and other lines. To 
make picture more complex during last 
two decades no internal social core 
based on civic values has been formed, 
while magnetism of external “anchors” 
(former metropolis) has been steadily 
growing. At the same time, dividing 
lines risk getting deeper due to political 
manipulation and dissatisfi ed citizenry. 
Moldovan government should focus on 
solutions favoring all society groups 
aiming at nurturing sentiments of civic 
satisfaction. 
• Friendly, open and eﬃ  cient public oﬃ  cials dealing with citizens would 
increase citizens’ trust in the state institutions and loyalty to the state 
as a whole. This would help fostering stronger civil identity. In such 
countries as Moldova civic identity should come fi rst; ethnical or any 
other – the second;
• Comprehensive implementation of E-governance Program would 
result in citizens’ satisfaction in dealing with the state oﬃ  cials. This 
satisfaction would cut across diﬀ erent ethnic, religious and other lines;
• Targeted policy measures (such as social compensations) should be 
assessed properly before implementation (not like in case of transport 
compensations in Chisinau municipality) and afterwards explained 
properly to the stakeholders in the process;
• Promote joint cultural events, including via public TV and radio. Support 
for cultural events should gradually shift from events for distinct 
cultural groups to joint events that would facilitate cultural exchange 
and communication between diﬀ erent groups in the Moldovan society;
• The state-supported events should not mirror those promoted by the 
foreign Embassies, rather they should focus on helping its citizens with 
diﬀ erent cultural backgrounds to communicate and to learn from each 
other;
• Make Moldovan citizenship attractive to the country’s inhabitants both 
on the right and left bank of Nistru: negotiate a visa simplifi ed-to-free 
regime with EU;
Political and civic participation has 
been at historical lows, with citizens 
being increasingly disenchanted with 
their public representation. Public 
dissatisfaction erodes trust into state 
institutions and may sometimes result 
into civil unrest. What is really needed 
is to provide venues for transparent 
participation of diﬀ erent social 
groups, however, without jeopardizing 
eﬃ  ciency of the governance act.
• The participatory process should be fi lled with substance and involved 
groups should have real say in the consultation and decision-making 
process;
• The specifi c policy measures should be routinely discussed with the 
stake-holders representatives via permanent and ad-hoc formed 
working group meetings;
• Media presence of all political parties should be ensured via public TV 
and radio. Retaliation measures should be avoided as much as possible.
• Proper investigation of the post- April 5 elections should be ensured. 
Generally, public should be properly informed on the investigation of 
announced corruption cases, anti-competitive arrangements, etc.
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Development threat/challenge/risk/
opportunity Policy options / strategy
Security system in Moldova is 
fundamentally fl awed, and this refers to 
all its institutional components. There is 
a deeply enrooted culture of repression 
in the law enforcement bodies. Judicial 
and prosecution bodies preferred to 
be politically submissive rather than 
genuinely independent.
• Unfortunately, it seems that security system in Moldova cannot be 
restructured from inside; a very strong political will is necessary to 
create and maintain the reform impetus, which should start with 
demilitarization of the headquarters staﬀ  in all security bodies; 
• Justice and prosecution will become independent only if they become 
publicly accountable and right (both positive and negative) economic 
incentives are put in place, without undermining the willingness of the 
well intentioned judges and prosecutors to enforce the law;
The current government faces a tall 
order of proving Moldova’s European 
credentials after years of half-hearted 
eﬀ orts. While EU remains consumed 
with domestic institutional reforms 
and divided on certain foreign policy 
matters, Moldova has consistently failed 
to deliver on its euro-commitments. 
Moldova’s European aspirations will not 
be taken seriously and will not be seen 
as “urgency” if the country continues to 
fail with its homework.
• Moldova should focus to the eﬀ ective implementation of the 
commitments taken in front of the EU;
• Moldova should aim at ambitious goals with important value for its 
citizens and make them part of the joint commitments with the EU. 
Although the EU may be reluctant to concede such commitments 
it is in Moldova’s interest to assure European counterparts that 
ultimate realization of these commitments is only possible if Moldova 
thoroughly implements the attached roadmaps and action plans. This 
will ensure that full realization of these commitments does not result in 
additional burden or risks posed by Moldova to the EU. For instance:
? Agreement on visa free travel would require implementation of 
an action plan aimed at ensuring proper border control, migration 
management, etc.
? Agreement on free trade would require Moldova to enforce 
competition rules, implement quality and safety standards, etc.
• Shift from emphatic declarations (like becoming EU member in two 
years time) to groundwork. Many countries with less European 
perspective and less rhetoric have attained some enviable practical 
progress, like Belarus agri-businesses exporting meat to the EU.
Russia’s presence in region becomes 
stronger, while due to its sheer size 
it holds considerable leverages over 
many countries in the region, including 
Moldova. With friendlier regime in 
Ukraine, Russia may demonstrate more 
interest and more elaborate policy 
towards Moldova, which appears to 
be quite divided on matters of policy 
towards Russia. For Moldova it is crucial 
to fi nd the way to deal with this player 
without being submissive with respect 
to its national interests.
• Keep regular clear-air meetings with Russian counterparts to ensure 
proper communication and avoiding erratic spirit of the relations in the 
communist era;
• Work together with Russian counterparts in order to ensure that 
interests of Moldovan companies and citizens in Moldova are observed 
and respected;
• Convey a message of “respect” to Russian Federation, but stick to 
European integration overarching priority; among others ensure Russia 
that:
? Its economic and investment interests will not receive a 
discriminatory treatment;
? Russian-speaking minority’s rights will be respected and it will 
receive equal treatment in Moldova, while Russian-language media 
will not be closed or bullied but rather treated in line with the 
national legislation;
? Underline Moldova’s intention to stay neutral;
? If there are pressures that would impede Moldova’s progress on 
the EU integration (for instance, energy issues) be diplomatic 
enough to show that these pressures go against Moldova’s 
European commitments and involve the EU if necessary;
? Keep reminding Russia about its commitments with respect to 
Transnistrian confl ict, but be ready this show would go on for some 
time. With European support wage a war for hearts and minds 
of Transnistria’s inhabitants, including cooperation projects on 
community and business levels.
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opportunity Policy options / strategy
Romania is set to substantially increase 
its role as Moldova’s advocate in the 
process of European integration. 
• While this development is welcome and well-intentioned, Moldovan 
authorities should be cautious that these eﬀ orts do not end up counter-
productive for the domestic policy agenda. 
• The Romanian advocacy agenda should be coordinated with Moldovan 
policy agenda.
• Moldova seeks to preserve its statehood; so any unionist statements 
should be kept in check.
Ukraine is in post-electoral transition; 
it will take some time until its policy 
agenda takes clearer shape. The bet is it 
will become more Russia-friendly, while 
preserving its course towards European 
integration. Ukraine holds key (at least 
one of them) to Moldovan security and 
European integration. Moldova should 
be keen to preserve friendly relations 
with this country and closer cooperate 
where it suits Moldovan interests
• Sort out all remaining contentious issues, such as property, territorial 
disputes, etc.;
• Closely cooperate with Ukraine on matters of European integration 
(but also cooperation in energy issues), including experience exchange 
where one of the country is more advanced (for instance, FTA 
negotiation). However, if supported by the progress on the ground, it 
may be reasonable for Moldova to decouple itself to Ukraine and fast-
forward on its path;
• Some prominent fi gures in Ukrainian political establishment have 
Moldovan roots, it is sensible to use these “emotional” bonds to good 
ends in cooperation between two countries;
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Annex: overview of the results of the sociological survey 
“Moldova 2009: state of the country and of the people”
Sample size: 1070 persons aged 18 and above. 
Sample: stratifi ed, probabilistic, three-stage.
Stratifi cation criteria: 12 geographic regions, residential area (urban/rural), size of urban areas 
(four types), type of rural areas (commune/adjacent village).
Randomization stages: Community (75 preselected communities, 208 sampling points), 
Household/Family, Individual.
Representativeness: the sample is representative for the adult population of the Republic of 
Moldova (except Transnistria region), allowing for a maximum error of ±3%.
Data collection period: October 11-29, 2009. 
Structure of the sample:
Variable Group number of respondents %
Gender Male 423 39,5
Female 647 60,5
Age 18 - 29 years 230 21,5
30 - 44 years 239 22,3
45 - 59 years 303 28,3
above 60 years 298 27,9
Education Incomplete secondary 247 23,1
Secondary of vocational 434 40,6
Upper secondary 158 14,8
Tertiary 226 21,1
no answer 5 0,5
Occupation Private entrepreneur 49 4,7
Employee 265 25,2
Temporarily unemployed 268 25,5
Unemployed 471 44,7
no answer 17 1,6
Nationality Moldovan/Romanian 832 77,8
Russian 63 5,9
Ukrainian 88 8,2
Other 69 6,4
Household’s monthly 
income group
Below 500 lei 104 9,7
501-1000 lei 250 23,4
1001-3000 lei 313 29,3
above 3001 lei 142 13,3
no answer 261 24,4
Area or residence Urban 442 41,3
Rural 628 58,7
Type of community Chisinau 196 18,3
Other community 874 81,7
TOTAL 1070 100
A n n e x
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very good
5%
no answer
5%
very bad
7%
rather bad
28%
diﬃcult to say
27%
rather good
28%
Do you believe that Moldova’s image in the world 
is …
The answers are distributed rather equally, with 
balance slightly tipped into negative. However, 
some improvements in comparison with 2007 are 
noticeable. Capital-city residents as well as elderly 
tend to have positive perceptions regarding 
Moldovan image abroad. 
no answer
8%completely
disagree
6%
completely 
agree
4%
to certain 
extent agree
25%
diﬃcult to say
26%
to certain 
extent
disagree
31%
To which extent do you believe that Moldova 
successfully promotes its interests in the world?
Slightly more respondents believe that Moldova 
fails to eﬀ ectively promote its interests abroad. 
In comparison with 2007 the balance worsened 
somewhat. Quite interestingly, least educated, self-
employed along with ethnical Russians respondents 
being apparently most satisfi ed with Moldova’s 
ability to promote its interests abroad.
good
48%
bad
13%
diﬃcult to say
12%
very bad
3%
no answer
6% very good
18%
How do you appreciate the Republic of Moldova 
in general, as a place of living?
Moldovans are in love with their country, at least 
this is what the answers to this question show. A 
signifi cant progress can be attested in comparison 
with 2007.However, this aﬀ ection is weaker 
considerably in the case of ethnical Russians, young 
people and temporarily unemployed.
I am rather 
proud
46%
I am very 
proud
35%
diﬃcult to 
say
10%
I am rather 
sorry
6%
I am definitely 
sorry
2%
no answer
1%
What feelings do you have in connection with 
the fact of being citizens of the Republic of 
Moldova?
It’s been from good to better for Moldovan 
patriotism. The numbers of those proud to be 
Moldovan were high in 2007; they got higher in 2009. 
Importantly, the degree of patriotism depends a 
little on educational or ethnical background, gender 
or income. It is a bit lower in the case of Chisinau 
inhabitants and ethnical minorities. 
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diﬃcult to 
say
26%
I rather 
believe there 
is such a 
goal/idea
31%
Certainly 
there is such 
a goal/idea
13%
I rather 
believe there 
is no such a 
goal/idea
12%
Certainly 
there is no 
such a 
goal/idea
6%
no answer
12%
Some citizens believe that in our country there is 
a common goal or a common idea uniting all the 
people. What do you believe about this?
Again the survey shows a rather positive evolution 
from 2007 to 2009. Almost half of all respondents 
believe in a common idea, with highest support in 
Chsinau and among persons with higher education. 
Ethnic Russians are a conspicuous exception in this 
respect. After all, only one question is hanging in 
the air: do all these people have a common idea in 
mind?
very good
17%
diﬃcult to 
say
13%
rather good
56%
rather bad
10%
very bad
1%
no answer
3%
How do you evaluate the relations between 
people of diﬀ erent ethnicities living in the 
Republic of Moldova?
The picture is a bit bleaker than in 2007, nonetheless, 
broad majority is pretty content with the state of 
inter-ethnic relations in the country. Moreover, this 
is the matter where no major diﬀ erences can be 
observed among people of diﬀ erent backgrounds.
I fully 
disagree
3%
no answer
4%
I fully agree
22%
I rather 
disagree
15%
diﬃcult to 
say
15%
I rather agree
41%
To what extent do you agree with the aﬃ  rmation 
that education in our society can ensure one’s 
success in life?
The education has been becoming more of an asset 
for Moldovans. Even more Moldovans believe the 
education will help them make their way to success 
in life. It is almost general belief, with only self-
employed and people of other (than Moldovan, 
Ukrainian, Russian) nationality being a bit more 
cautious in this respect.  
It is much 
easier 
1%
no answer
7%
It is much 
more difficult
22%
It is a bit 
more difficult
37%
diﬃcult to
say
25%
It is a bit 
easier
8%
In comparison with the situation in the previous 
year, is it easier or more diﬃ  cult today to fi nd a 
well-paid job in the Republic of Moldova?
The survey shows that the prospects have been 
getting dimmer. It is particularly true for the people 
aged between 30-59 age, self-employed and those 
with lower education level. Residents of the capital 
certainly live in a brighter reality as they see their 
prospects to get well-paid job with more hope. This 
gloomy picture should not surprise, as crisis has 
certainly hit Moldova.
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diﬃcult 
to say
29%
It is rather 
not prepared
38%
It is fully 
prepared
1%no answer6%
It is not 
prepared at  all
15%
It is rather 
prepared
11%
To what extent, in your opinion, is our country 
prepared to face calamities (for example, 
droughts, fl oods, big fi res)?
The situation has got worse somewhat. Only tenth 
of Moldovans believe that the country is prepared 
to face calamities. This disbelief in the country’s 
ability is wide-spread and equally shared between 
diﬀ erent groups of population. However, the self-
employed are the most skeptical.
Rather no
39%
no answer
5%
Definitely yes
2%
Rather yes
15%
diﬃcult to say
21%
Definitely no
18%
If you, or your close relatives were in a diﬃ  cult 
situation (due to a sickness, loss of a job, natural 
calamities etc.), do you believe you could count 
on full support from the state?
The share of those hoping for helping hand of state in 
the case of need has grown somewhat, but remains 
meager: less than one-fi fth of citizens nurture such 
hope. The expectations are particularly low in the 
case of younger people, self-employed, Chisinau 
residents and ethnic minorities.
Some
distrust
26%
Full trust
3%no answer
7%
Full distrust
18%
diﬃcult 
to say
17%
Some trust
29%
How much trust do you have in the domestic 
banking system?
Despite all gloom and doom, Moldovan banking 
system remained as much stable as it was in 2007; 
at least, this is what Moldovan citizens think. The 
overall trust in banking system barely budged 
from 2007 to 2009. Notwithstanding, it is still 
rather low, with majority of citizens still anxious 
of the creditworthiness of the bank systems. The 
only categories with prevailing trust in banking 
systems are residents of Chisinau and people with 
high incomes (over 3000 MDL). Well, perhaps, they 
know better…
no answer
2%
Some trust
43%
Full trust
11%
Full distrust
10%
Some
distrust
22%
diﬃcult 
to say
12%
How much trust do you have in local public 
administration from you community?
The distribution of answers show that majority of 
citizens do trust their local public administrations. 
What is important, this trust substantially 
consolidated from 2007 to 2009. The trust is the 
highest among the capital-city dwellers.
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Never
10%
Seldom
25%
diﬃcult  
to say
24%
Yes, often
30%
Yes, always
4%
no answer
7%
Do you believe that ordinary citizens can directly, 
or through initiative groups, infl uence decision-
making in your community? 
Majority of Moldovans still believe they have 
little say over the decision-making process at the 
community level. Although, the situation has 
improved somewhat. Your voice has more chances 
to be heard if you live in Chisinau, have high incomes 
and education, and/or belong to ethnical majority. 
Sorry for the rest… 
Rather no
21%
diﬃcult  
to say
21%
Rather yes
39%
Definitely yes
8%Definitely no
5%
no answer
6%
Do you believe that by participating in the 
elections you can infl uence the situation in the 
Your vote matters after all. The distribution of 
answers shows that more Moldovans believe they 
can change things via elections than those who 
do not. This statement is especially true in the 
case of those with high incomes and education as 
well as living in Chisinau. On the opposite side, the 
disgruntled voters mainly include self-employed, 
ethnical minorities (again!) and urban areas other 
than Chisinau.
rather not 
reflected
32% diﬃcult 
to say
29%
to some 
extent
22%
fully
2%
not at all
8%
no answer
7%
To what extent do state policies refl ect your 
interests and expectations?
Less than quarter of respondents see their interests 
and expectations refl ected in the state policies. This 
picture is worrisome, although situation apparently 
improved slightly from 2007 to 2009. Most 
dissatisfi ed with the state policies are those aged 
30-44, having vocational education background, 
being simple employee, coming from ethnic 
minorities and/or urban area other than Chisinau, 
and having low income. On the opposite pole, are 
Chisinau dwellers whose views are squarely divided 
on this matter.
diﬃcult 
to say
23%
no answer
5%none ot 
them
6%
some of 
them
22%
most of 
them are not
42%
all of them
2%
Do you generally believe that your rights are 
respected in our society?
Quite a worrying distribution of answers and much 
worse than in 2007! The big share of “diﬃ  cult to 
say” should not be interpreted in a neutral way. 
Youth and those with more advanced education 
background tend to be more pessimistic regarding 
their rights as compared the elderly and those with 
less advanced educational background. 
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no answer
5%
surely yes
2%
rather yes
22%
diﬃcult 
to say
27%
surely no
10%
rather no
34%
In case your legitimate rights are violated, do you 
believe that justice system in our country would 
restore to you those rights?
Again, besides 43% of people having negative 
expectations, there is a large number of persons 
who cannot say accurately whether they trust or 
not the justice. Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians tend 
to have a more negative balance of answers than 
representatives of other ethnicities. 
rather yes
23%
diﬃcult 
to say
24%
surely yes
3%
no answer
6%
surely no
9%
rather no
35%
Do you believe that your personal and your family 
security is ensured in our country?
Interesting to note, the younger cohorts of the 
population feel more insecure than others. We 
believe this is related to the April 2009 political 
violence. Feelings of insecurity tend to abate as 
peoples incomes increase, and those residing in 
other communities than Chisinau feel generally less 
secure. 
9 18,6 48,9 16,7 5,51,1
Families are much more united Families are a bit more united
There is no diﬀerence Family relations seem to worsen
There is acute deterioration of relations no answer
Compared to the situation 10 years ago, what 
do you think about the family relations in the 
Republic of Moldova today?
Moldovan women are more pessimistic than 
men regarding the families’ strength. Lack of job 
and smaller income appear as signifi cant factors 
weakening family ties. Also, for the traditional 
Moldova society, it is a surprise that rural dwellers 
perceive a more severe worsening of family relations 
than urban ones.
2,6 14,7 22,6 40,3 12,7 7
much better slightly better
There is no diﬀerence slightly worse
much worse no answer
Thinking about the conditions determining the 
decision of young families to have children, what 
is your opinion about those conditions today in 
comparison with last year?
Quite interesting, the younger ones are less 
pessimistic than the older ones regarding young 
families having a child. Those enjoying higher income 
are more positive about family growth as well. A 
very negative balance of answers of the villagers is 
in line with depressing demographic trends there 
and with their destitute economic situation. 
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1,3 9,4 47,5 29,5 10,6 1,6
much increased a bit increased
There is no diﬀerence a bit decreased
much decreased no answer
How has your income changed this year in 
comparison with the previous year?
Due the economic recession income declined across 
the board in 2009. However, the capital area was 
less hit than periphery, which to certain extent 
correlates with the polarized economic growth 
that we have seen so far. Rural dwellers and the 
poor were the most severely aﬀ ected.  
no answer
3%
a bit 
worsened
29%
There is no 
diﬀerence
46%
much 
improved
1%
a bit 
improved
15%
much 
worsened
6%
How have you living standards changed this year 
in comparison with the previous year? 
Standards of living are perceived to have suﬀ ered 
a bit less than income, but balance is negative 
again. The same correlations hold in case of living 
standards as in case of income. The eye-catching 
fact is households enjoying higher income improved 
their living standards in 2009.
no answer
0%very bad
5%
very good
4%
good
50%
diﬃcult to 
say
16%
bad
25%
How do you appreciate your health status?
Well, if not rich, at least healthy. Normally, balance 
of answers turn from positive for youth to negative 
for elderly. Unemployment, rural residency and 
lower level of income clearly associates with a 
poorer health situation. 
no answer
4%
quite
satisfied
35%
quite
unsatisfied
34%
diﬃcult to 
say
21%
totally 
satisfied
2%totally 
unsatisfied
4%
How satisfi ed are you with the quality of 
environment? 
General balance of answers is marginally negative. 
While rural inhabitants enjoy cleaner environment 
than urban ones in general, it is striking that 
people in Chisinau are positive about the state of 
environment. 
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no answer
4%
much
improved
1%
a bit 
improved
23%
much
worsened
5%
a bit 
worsened
38%
diﬃcult to 
say
29%
How do you appreciate the evolution of 
environment quality in the last 3 years?
Everybody in Moldova seems to be equally 
displeased about the environment dynamics in 
the last 3 years. However, situation appears much 
worse in small towns than everywhere else.
definitely yes
47%
rather yes
29%
definitely no
3% no answer
2%rather no
7%
diﬃcult to 
say
12%
Would you like your children or grandchildren to 
live in the Republic of Moldova?
Despite its problems, Moldova seems to be a 
country sought for living, at least by its citizens. Do 
people really like this country and trust its future, if 
not its present? Apparently, yes, but it is noticeable 
that elderly are more willing than the youth to see 
their oﬀ spring remaining in the country.
rather yes
24%
no answer
4%
diﬃcult to 
say
17%
rather no
23%
definitely no
17%
definitely yes
15%
If you had the opportunity to emigrate to work 
abroad in the next 3 months, would you accept 
it?
Moldovans like their country in long-run (see 
previous and next questions), but in the short one 
many of them – especially women, mid-aged and 
elderly, with lower educational profi le, rural - would 
like to get out for a more decent job. Chisinau 
residents are less frantic in this respect.
I would 
never leave 
26%
diﬃcult to 
say
22%
I would rather
 not leave
25%
I would 
rather 
15%
I would 
definitely leave
8%
NR
4%
leave
Should you have the opportunity to leave 
Moldova for good, together with your family, in 
order to start a new life, what would you choose 
to do?
Even though many Moldovans would not refuse the 
opportunity to make some money abroad, they are 
not ready to leave Moldova for good. This is less true 
in case of the youth, with slightly more than half of 
them willing to settle abroad. Rural inhabitants are 
more than others tied to their homeland.
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Which answer describes the best situation of your household regarding access to the following 
services and technologies
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Running water
Hot water
Sewage system
Gas
Public transport
Roads
Electric power
Thermal energy
Landline telephone
Mobile telephone
Computer
Internet
TV set
A
xi
s
Ti
tl
e
Axis Title
I do not have access to
this service
I have certain problems
accessing this service
Most of the time I am
satisfied with the access
to this service
I have full access to this
service
no answer
No comments. 
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A b o u t  E x p e r t - G r u p
Expert-Grup is an independent think-tank from the Republic of Moldova. It has been actively 
working in Moldova since 2005. Its institutional mission is to contribute to the economic, 
political and social development of the Republic of Moldova as well as to support consolidation 
of the country’s international competitiveness. Expert-Grup aims to accomplish this mission by 
delivering top quality analytical services and promoting eﬃ  cient, transparent and innovative 
models in economic and social policies.
Expert-Grup is part of the PASOS network of policy centers reuniting about 40 think-tanks from 
more than 20 European countries. 
As part of its permanent activity, Expert-Grup provides the public with relevant and most up-
to-date analysis on economic and social policies; assists the decision-making and policy-making 
processes and promotes innovative development models. Expert-Grup has knowledge and 
extensive experience in the following areas: development strategies; macroeconomics and 
economic systems; global economy and international economic relations; economy of the 
European integration; monetary and fi scal policies; labor economy, management and business 
culture; consumer behavior; industrial and agricultural economics; economy of health and 
education.
Our contact details:
Post address: MD-2012, Columna str., 133, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
Telephone: ++373-22-93-00-14
Fax: ++373-22-21-15-99
Email: info@expert-grup.org 
Web page: www.expert-grup.org
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